The dark side of history: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/
Counterintelligence (counter-intelligence) or counterespionage (counter-espionage) is any activity aimed at protecting an agency's intelligence program from an opposition's intelligence service.[1] It includes gathering information and conducting activities to prevent espionage, sabotage, assassinations or other intelligence activities conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons.
Many countries will have multiple organizations focusing on a different aspect of counterintelligence, such as domestic, international, and counter-terrorism. Some states will formalize it as part of the police structure, such as the United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Others will establish independent bodies, such as the United Kingdom's MI5, others have both intelligence and counterintelligence grouped under the same agency, like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
History
Political cartoon depicting the Afghan Emir Sher Ali with his "friends" the Russian Bear and British Lion (1878). The Great Game saw the rise of systematic espionage and surveillance throughout the region by both powers
Modern tactics of espionage and dedicated government intelligence agencies developed over the course of the late-19th century. A key background to this development was The Great Game – the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire throughout Central Asia between 1830 and 1895. To counter Russian ambitions in the region and the potential threat it posed to the British position in India, the Indian Civil Service built up a system of surveillance, intelligence and counterintelligence. The existence of this shadowy conflict was popularized in Rudyard Kipling's famous spy book, Kim (1901), where he portrayed the Great Game (a phrase Kipling popularized) as an espionage and intelligence conflict that "never ceases, day or night".[2]
The establishment of dedicated intelligence and counterintelligence organizations had much to do with the colonial rivalries between the major European powers and to the accelerating development of military technology. As espionage became more widely used, it became imperative to expand the role of existing police and internal security forces into a role of detecting and countering foreign spies. The Evidenzbureau (founded in the Austrian Empire in 1850) had the role from the late-19th century of countering the actions of the Pan-Slavist movement operating out of Serbia.
After the fallout from the Dreyfus affair of 1894–1906 in France, responsibility for French military counter-espionage passed in 1899 to the Sûreté générale—an agency originally responsible for order enforcement and public safety—and overseen by the Ministry of the Interior.[3]
The Okhrana, founded in 1880, had the task of countering enemy espionage against Imperial Russia. St. Petersburg Okhrana group photo, 1905
The Okhrana[4] initially formed in 1880 to combat political terrorism and left-wing revolutionary activity throughout the Russian Empire, was also tasked with countering enemy espionage.[5] Its main concern was the activities of revolutionaries, who often worked and plotted subversive actions from abroad. It set up a branch in Paris, run by Pyotr Rachkovsky, to monitor their activities. The agency used many methods to achieve its goals, including covert operations, undercover agents, and "perlustration"—the interception and reading of private correspondence. The Okhrana became notorious for its use of agents provocateurs, who often succeeded in penetrating the activities of revolutionary groups – including the Bolsheviks.[6]
Integrated counterintelligence agencies run directly by governments were also established. The British government founded the Secret Service Bureau in 1909 as the first independent and interdepartmental agency fully in control over all government counterintelligence activities.
Due to intense lobbying from William Melville and after he obtained German mobilization plans and proof of their financial support to the Boers, the British government authorized the formation of a new intelligence section in the War Office, MO3 (subsequently redesignated MO5) headed by Melville, in 1903. Working under-cover from a flat in London, Melville ran both counterintelligence and foreign intelligence operations, capitalizing on the knowledge and foreign contacts he had accumulated during his years running Special Branch.
Due to its success, the Government Committee on Intelligence, with support from Richard Haldane and Winston Churchill, established the Secret Service Bureau in 1909 as a joint initiative of the Admiralty, the War Office and the Foreign Office to control secret intelligence operations in the UK and overseas, particularly concentrating on the activities of the Imperial German government. Its first director was Captain Sir George Mansfield Smith-Cumming alias "C".[7] The Secret Service Bureau was split into a foreign and counter-intelligence domestic service in 1910. The latter, headed by Sir Vernon Kell, originally aimed at calming public fears of large-scale German espionage.[8] As the Service was not authorized with police powers, Kell liaised extensively with the Special Branch of Scotland Yard (headed by Basil Thomson), and succeeded in disrupting the work of Indian revolutionaries collaborating with the Germans during the war. Instead of a system whereby rival departments and military services would work on their own priorities with little to no consultation or cooperation with each other, the newly established Secret Intelligence Service was interdepartmental, and submitted its intelligence reports to all relevant government departments.[9]
For the first time, governments had access to peacetime, centralized independent intelligence and counterintelligence bureaucracy with indexed registries and defined procedures, as opposed to the more ad hoc methods used previously.
Categories
Collective counterintelligence is gaining information about an opponent's intelligence collection capabilities whose aim is at an entity.
Defensive counterintelligence is thwarting efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate the service.
Offensive counterintelligence is having identified an opponent's efforts against the system, trying to manipulate these attacks by either "turning" the opponent's agents into double agents or feeding them false information to report.[10]
Counterintelligence, counterterror, and government
Many governments organize counterintelligence agencies separately and distinct from their intelligence collection services. In most countries the counterintelligence mission is spread over multiple organizations, though one usually predominates. There is usually a domestic counterintelligence service, usually part of a larger law enforcement organization such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States.[11]
The United Kingdom has the separate Security Service, also known as MI5, which does not have direct police powers but works closely with law enforcement especially Special Branch that can carry out arrests, do searches with a warrant, etc.[12]
The Russian Federation's major domestic security organization is the FSB, which principally came from the Second Chief Directorate and Third Chief Directorate of the USSR's KGB.
Canada separates the functions of general defensive counterintelligence (contre-ingérence), security intelligence (the intelligence preparation necessary to conduct offensive counterintelligence), law enforcement intelligence, and offensive counterintelligence.
Military organizations have their own counterintelligence forces, capable of conducting protective operations both at home and when deployed abroad.[13] Depending on the country, there can be various mixtures of civilian and military in foreign operations. For example, while offensive counterintelligence is a mission of the US CIA's National Clandestine Service, defensive counterintelligence is a mission of the U.S. Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), Department of State, who work on protective security for personnel and information processed abroad at US Embassies and Consulates.[14]
The term counter-espionage is really specific to countering HUMINT, but, since virtually all offensive counterintelligence involves exploiting human sources, the term "offensive counterintelligence" is used here to avoid some ambiguous phrasing.
Other countries also deal with the proper organization of defenses against Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS), often with separate services with no common authority below the head of government.
France, for example, builds its domestic counterterror in a law enforcement framework. In France, a senior anti-terror magistrate is in charge of defense against terrorism. French magistrates have multiple functions that overlap US and UK functions of investigators, prosecutors, and judges. An anti-terror magistrate may call upon France's domestic intelligence service Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (DGSI), which may work with the Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE), foreign intelligence service.
Spain gives its Interior Ministry, with military support, the leadership in domestic counterterrorism. For international threats, the National Intelligence Center (CNI) has responsibility. CNI, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, is staffed principally by which is subordinated directly to the Prime Minister's office. After the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings, the national investigation found problems between the Interior Ministry and CNI, and, as a result, the National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Center was created. Spain's 3/11 Commission called for this center to do operational coordination as well as information collection and dissemination.[15] The military has organic counterintelligence to meet specific military needs.
Counterintelligence missions
Frank Wisner, a well-known CIA operations executive said of the autobiography of Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles,[16] that Dulles "disposes of the popular misconception that counterintelligence is essentially a negative and responsive activity, that it moves only or chiefly in reaction to situations thrust upon it and in counter to initiatives mounted by the opposition." Rather, he sees that can be most effective, both in information gathering and protecting friendly intelligence services, when it creatively but vigorously attacks the "structure and personnel of hostile intelligence services."[17] Today's counterintelligence missions have broadened from the time when the threat was restricted to the foreign intelligence services (FIS) under the control of nation-states. Threats have broadened to include threats from non-national or trans-national groups, including internal insurgents, organized crime, and transnational based groups (often called "terrorists", but that is limiting). Still, the FIS term remains the usual way of referring to the threat against which counterintelligence protects.
In modern practice, several missions are associated with counterintelligence from the national to the field level.
Defensive analysis is the practice of looking for vulnerabilities in one's own organization, and, with due regard for risk versus benefit, closing the discovered holes.
Offensive counterespionage is the set of techniques that at least neutralizes discovered FIS personnel and arrests them or, in the case of diplomats, expels them by declaring them persona non grata. Beyond that minimum, it exploits FIS personnel to gain intelligence for one's own side, or actively manipulates the FIS personnel to damage the hostile FIS organization.
Counterintelligence force protection source operations (CFSO) are human source operations, conducted abroad that are intended to fill the existing gap in national-level coverage in protecting a field station or force from terrorism and espionage.
Counterintelligence is part of intelligence cycle security, which, in turn, is part of intelligence cycle management. A variety of security disciplines also fall under intelligence security management and complement counterintelligence, including:
Physical security
Personnel security
Communications security (COMSEC)
Informations system security (INFOSEC)
security classification
Operations security (OPSEC)
The disciplines involved in "positive security," measures by which one's own society collects information on its actual or potential security, complement security. For example, when communications intelligence identifies a particular radio transmitter as one used only by a particular country, detecting that transmitter inside one's own country suggests the presence of a spy that counterintelligence should target. In particular, counterintelligence has a significant relationship with the collection discipline of HUMINT and at least some relationship with the others. Counterintelligence can both produce information and protect it.
All US departments and agencies with intelligence functions are responsible for their own security abroad, except those that fall under Chief of Mission authority.[18]
Governments try to protect three things:
Their personnel
Their installations
Their operations
In many governments, the responsibility for protecting these things is split. Historically, CIA assigned responsibility for protecting its personnel and operations to its Office of Security, while it assigned the security of operations to multiple groups within the Directorate of Operations: the counterintelligence staff and the area (or functional) unit, such as Soviet Russia Division. At one point, the counterintelligence unit operated quite autonomously, under the direction of James Jesus Angleton. Later, operational divisions had subordinate counterintelligence branches, as well as a smaller central counterintelligence staff. Aldrich Ames was in the Counterintelligence Branch of Europe Division, where he was responsible for directing the analysis of Soviet intelligence operations. US military services have had a similar and even more complex split.
This kind of division clearly requires close coordination, and this in fact occurs on a daily basis. The interdependence of the US counterintelligence community is also manifest in its relationships with liaison services. The counterintelligence community cannot cut off these relationships because of concern about security, but experience has shown that it must calculate the risks involved.[18]
On the other side of the CI coin, counterespionage has one purpose that transcends all others in importance: penetration. The emphasis which the KGB places on penetration is evident in the cases already discussed from the defensive or security viewpoint. The best security system in the world cannot provide an adequate defense against it because the technique involves people. The only way to be sure that an enemy has been contained is to know his plans in advance and in detail.
Moreover, only a high-level penetration of the opposition can tell you whether your own service is penetrated. A high-level defector can also do this, but the adversary knows that he defected and within limits can take remedial action. Conducting CE without the aid of penetrations is like fighting in the dark. Conducting CE with penetrations can be like shooting fish in a barrel.[18]
In the British service, the cases of the Cambridge Five, and the later suspicions about MI5 chief Sir Roger Hollis caused great internal dissension. Clearly, the British were penetrated by Philby, but it has never been determined, in any public forum, if there were other serious penetrations. In the US service, there was also significant disruption over the contradictory accusations about moles from defectors Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko, and their respective supporters in CIA and the British Security Service (MI5). Golitsyn was generally believed by Angleton. George Kisevalter, the CIA operations officer that was the CIA side of the joint US-UK handling of Oleg Penkovsky, did not believe Angleton's theory that Nosenko was a KGB plant. Nosenko had exposed John Vassall, a KGB asset principally in the British Admiralty, but there were arguments Vassall was a KGB sacrifice to protect other operations, including Nosenko and a possibly more valuable source on the Royal Navy.
Defensive counterintelligence
Defensive counterintelligence starts by looking for places in one's own organization that could easily be exploited by foreign intelligence services (FIS). FIS is an established term of art in the counterintelligence community, and, in today's world, "foreign" is shorthand for "opposing." Opposition might indeed be a country, but it could be a transnational group or an internal insurgent group. Operations against a FIS might be against one's own nation, or another friendly nation. The range of actions that might be done to support a friendly government can include a wide range of functions, certainly including military or counterintelligence activities, but also humanitarian aid and aid to development ("nation building").[19]
Terminology here is still emerging, and "transnational group" could include not only terrorist groups but also transnational criminal organization. Transnational criminal organizations include the drug trade, money laundering, extortion targeted against computer or communications systems, smuggling, etc.
"Insurgent" could be a group opposing a recognized government by criminal or military means, as well as conducting clandestine intelligence and covert operations against the government in question, which could be one's own or a friendly one.
Counterintelligence and counterterrorism analyses provide strategic assessments of foreign intelligence and terrorist groups and prepare tactical options for ongoing operations and investigations. Counterespionage may involve proactive acts against foreign intelligence services, such as double agents, deception, or recruiting foreign intelligence officers. While clandestine HUMINT sources can give the greatest insight into the adversary's thinking, they may also be most vulnerable to the adversary's attacks on one's own organization. Before trusting an enemy agent, remember that such people started out as being trusted by their own countries and may still be loyal to that country.
Offensive counterintelligence operations
Wisner emphasized his own, and Dulles', views that the best defense against foreign attacks on, or infiltration of, intelligence services is active measures against those hostile services.[17] This is often called counterespionage: measures taken to detect enemy espionage or physical attacks against friendly intelligence services, prevent damage and information loss, and, where possible, to turn the attempt back against its originator. Counterespionage goes beyond being reactive and actively tries to subvert hostile intelligence service, by recruiting agents in the foreign service, by discrediting personnel actually loyal to their own service, and taking away resources that would be useful to the hostile service. All of these actions apply to non-national threats as well as to national organizations.
If the hostile action is in one's own country or in a friendly one with co-operating police, the hostile agents may be arrested, or, if diplomats, declared persona non grata. From the perspective of one's own intelligence service, exploiting the situation to the advantage of one's side is usually preferable to arrest or actions that might result in the death of the threat. The intelligence priority sometimes comes into conflict with the instincts of one's own law enforcement organizations, especially when the foreign threat combines foreign personnel with citizens of one's country.
In some circumstances, arrest may be a first step in which the prisoner is given the choice of co-operating or facing severe consequence up to and including a death sentence for espionage. Co-operation may consist of telling all one knows about the other service but preferably actively assisting in deceptive actions against the hostile service.
Counterintelligence protection of intelligence services
Defensive counterintelligence specifically for intelligence services involves risk assessment of their culture, sources, methods and resources. Risk management must constantly reflect those assessments, since effective intelligence operations are often risk-taking. Even while taking calculated risks, the services need to mitigate risk with appropriate countermeasures.
FIS are especially able to explore open societies and, in that environment, have been able to subvert insiders in the intelligence community. Offensive counterespionage is the most powerful tool for finding penetrators and neutralizing them, but it is not the only tool. Understanding what leads individuals to turn on their own side is the focus of Project Slammer. Without undue violations of personal privacy, systems can be developed to spot anomalous behavior, especially in the use of information systems.
Decision makers require intelligence free from hostile control or manipulation. Since every intelligence discipline is subject to manipulation by our adversaries, validating the reliability of intelligence from all collection platforms is essential. Accordingly, each counterintelligence organization will validate the reliability of sources and methods that relate to the counterintelligence mission in accordance with common standards. For other mission areas, the USIC will examine collection, analysis, dissemination practices, and other intelligence activities and will recommend improvements, best practices, and common standards.[20]
Intelligence is vulnerable not only to external but also to internal threats. Subversion, treason, and leaks expose vulnerabilities, governmental and commercial secrets, and intelligence sources and methods. The insider threat has been a source of extraordinary damage to US national security, as with Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Edward Lee Howard, all of whom had access to major clandestine activities. Had an electronic system to detect anomalies in browsing through counterintelligence files been in place, Robert Hanssen's searches for suspicion of activities of his Soviet (and later Russian) paymasters might have surfaced early. Anomalies might simply show that an especially-creative analyst has a trained intuition possible connections and is trying to research them.
Adding the new tools and techniques to [national arsenals], the counterintelligence community will seek to manipulate foreign spies, conduct aggressive investigations, make arrests and, where foreign officials are involved, expel them for engaging in practices inconsistent with their diplomatic status or exploit them as an unwitting channel for deception, or turn them into witting double agents.[20] "Witting" is a term of intelligence art that indicates that one is not only aware of a fact or piece of information but also aware of its connection to intelligence activities.
Victor Suvorov, the pseudonym of a former Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer, makes the point that a defecting HUMINT officer is a special threat to walk-in or other volunteer assets of the country that he is leaving. Volunteers who are "warmly welcomed" do not take into consideration the fact that they are despised by hostile intelligence agents.
The Soviet operational officer, having seen a great deal of the ugly face of communism, very frequently feels the utmost repulsion to those who sell themselves to it willingly. And when a GRU or KGB officer decides to break with his criminal organization, something which fortunately happens quite often, the first thing he will do is try to expose the hated volunteer.[21]
Counterintelligence force protection source operations
Attacks against military, diplomatic, and related facilities are a very real threat, as demonstrated by the 1983 attacks against French and US peacekeepers in Beirut, the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, 1998 attacks on Colombian bases and on U.S. embassies (and local buildings) in Kenya and Tanzania the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, and many others. The U.S. military force protection measures are the set of actions taken against military personnel and family members, resources, facilities and critical information, and most countries have a similar doctrine for protecting those facilities and conserving the potential of the forces. Force protection is defined to be a defense against deliberate attack, not accidents or natural disasters.
Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) are human source operations, normally clandestine in nature, conducted abroad that are intended to fill the existing gap in national level coverage, as well as satisfying the combatant commander's intelligence requirements.[22] Military police and other patrols that mingle with local people may indeed be valuable HUMINT sources for counterintelligence awareness, but are not themselves likely to be CFSOs. Gleghorn distinguishes between the protection of national intelligence services, and the intelligence needed to provide combatant commands with the information they need for force protection. There are other HUMINT sources, such as military reconnaissance patrols that avoid mixing with foreign personnel, that indeed may provide HUMINT, but not HUMINT especially relevant to counterintelligence.[23] Active countermeasures, whether for force protection, protection of intelligence services, or protection of national security interests, are apt to involve HUMINT disciplines, for the purpose of detecting FIS agents, involving screening and debriefing of non-tasked human sources, also called casual or incidental sources. such as:
walk-ins and write-ins (individuals who volunteer information)
unwitting sources (any individual providing useful information to counterintelligence, who in the process of divulging such information may not know they are aiding an investigation)
defectors and enemy prisoners of war (EPW)
refugee populations and expatriates
interviewees (individuals contacted in the course of an investigation)
official liaison sources.
Physical security is important, but it does not override the role of force protection intelligence... Although all intelligence disciplines can be used to gather force protection intelligence, HUMINT collected by intelligence and CI agencies plays a key role in providing indications and warning of terrorist and other force protection threats.[24]
Force protection, for forces deployed in host countries, occupation duty, and even at home, may not be supported sufficiently by a national-level counterterrorism organization alone. In a country, colocating FPCI personnel, of all services, with military assistance and advisory units, allows agents to build relationships with host nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies, get to know the local environments, and improve their language skills. FPCI needs a legal domestic capability to deal with domestic terrorism threats.
As an example of terrorist planning cycles, the Khobar Towers attack shows the need for long-term FPCI. "The Hizballah operatives believed to have conducted this attack began intelligence collection and planning activities in 1993. They recognized American military personnel were billeted at Khobar Towers in the fall of 1994 and began surveillance of the facility, and continued to plan, in June 1995. In March 1996, Saudi Arabian border guards arrested a Hizballah member attempting plastic explosive into the country, leading to the arrest of two more Hizballah members. Hizballah leaders recruited replacements for those arrested, and continued planning for the attack."[25]
Defensive counterintelligence operations
In U.S. doctrine, although not necessarily that of other countries, CI is now seen as primarily a counter to FIS HUMINT. In the 1995 US Army counterintelligence manual, CI had a broader scope against the various intelligence collection disciplines. Some of the overarching CI tasks are described as
Developing, maintaining, and disseminating multidiscipline threat data and intelligence files on organizations, locations, and individuals of CI interest. This includes insurgent and terrorist infrastructure and individuals who can assist in the CI mission.
Educating personnel in all fields of security. A component of this is the multidiscipline threat briefing. Briefings can and should be tailored, both in scope and classification level. Briefings could then be used to familiarize supported commands with the nature of the multidiscipline threat posed against the command or activity.
More recent US joint intelligence doctrine[26] restricts its primary scope to counter-HUMINT, which usually includes counter-terror. It is not always clear, under this doctrine, who is responsible for all intelligence collection threats against a military or other resource. The full scope of US military counterintelligence doctrine has been moved to a classified publication, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
More specific countermeasures against intelligence collection disciplines are listed below
CI roles against Intelligence Collection Disciplines, 1995 doctrine[22] Discipline Offensive CI Defensive CI
HUMINT Counterreconnaissance, offensive counterespionage Deception in operations security
SIGINT Recommendations for kinetic and electronic attack Radio OPSEC, use of secure telephones, SIGSEC, deception
IMINT Recommendations for kinetic and electronic attack Deception, OPSEC countermeasures, deception (decoys, camouflage)
If accessible, use SATRAN reports of satellites overhead to hide or stop activities while being viewed
Counter-HUMINT
Counter-HUMINT deals with both the detection of hostile HUMINT sources within an organization, or the detection of individuals likely to become hostile HUMINT sources, as a mole or double agent. There is an additional category relevant to the broad spectrum of counterintelligence: why one becomes a terrorist.[citation needed]
The acronym MICE:
Money
Ideology
Compromise (or coercion)
Ego
describes the most common reasons people break trust and disclose classified materials, reveal operations to hostile services, or join terrorist groups. It makes sense, therefore, to monitor trusted personnel for risks in these areas, such as financial stress, extreme political views, potential vulnerabilities for blackmail, and excessive need for approval or intolerance of criticism. With luck, problems in an employee can be caught early, assistance can be provided to correct them, and not only is espionage avoided, but a useful employee retained.
Sometimes, the preventive and neutralization tasks overlap, as in the case of Earl Edwin Pitts. Pitts had been an FBI agent who had sold secret information to the Soviets, and, after the fall of the USSR, to the Russians. He was caught by an FBI false flag sting, in which FBI agents, posing as Russian FSB agents, came to Pitts with an offer to "reactivate" him. His activities seemed motivated by both money and ego over perceived bad treatment when he was an FBI agent. His sentence required him to tell the FBI all he knew of foreign agents. Ironically, he told them of suspicious actions by Robert Hanssen, which were not taken seriously at the time.
Motivations for information and operations disclosure
To go beyond slogans, Project Slammer was an effort of the Intelligence Community Staff, under the Director of Central Intelligence, to come up with characteristics of an individual likely to commit espionage against the United States. It "examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionage subjects. Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better understand the subjects' private lives and how they are perceived by others while conducting espionage."[27]
How an espionage subject sees himself (at the time of espionage) Attitude Manifestations
Basic belief structure – Special, even unique.
– Deserving.
– The individual's situation is not satisfactory.
– No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage).
– Doing only what others frequently do.
– Not a bad person.
– Performance in a government job (if presently employed) is separate from espionage; espionage does not (really) discount contribution in the workplace.
– Security procedures do not (really) apply to the individual.
– Security programs (e.g., briefings) have no meaning for the individual unless they connect with something with which they can personally identify.
Feels isolated from the consequences of his actions: – The individual sees their situation in a context in which they face continually narrowing options until espionage seems reasonable. The process that evolves into espionage reduces barriers, making it essentially "Okay" to initiate the crime.
– They see espionage as a "Victimless" crime.
– Once they consider espionage, they figure out how it might be done. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events.
– Subject finds that it is easy to go around security safeguards (or is able to solve that problem). They belittle the security system, feeling that if the information was really important espionage would be hard to do (the information would really be better protected). This "Ease of accomplishment" further reinforces resolve.
Attempts to cope with espionage activity – Anxious on initial hostile intelligence service contact (some also feel thrill and excitement).
– After a relationship with espionage activity and HOIS develops, the process becomes much more bearable, espionage continues (even flourishes).
– In the course of long-term activity, subjects may reconsider their involvement.
– Some consider breaking their role to become an operative for the government. This occurs when access to classified information is lost or there is a perceived need to prove themselves or both.
– Others find that espionage activity becomes stressful, they no longer want it. Glamour (if present earlier) subsides. They are reluctant to continue. They may even break contact.
– Sometimes they consider telling authorities what they have done. Those wanting to reverse their role aren't confessing, they're negotiating. Those who are "Stressed out" want to confess. Neither wants punishment. Both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.
According to a press report about Project Slammer and Congressional oversight of counterespionage, one fairly basic function is observing one's own personnel for behavior that either suggests that they could be targets for foreign HUMINT, or may already have been subverted. News reports indicate that in hindsight, red flags were flying but not noticed.[28] In several major penetrations of US services, such as Aldrich Ames, the Walker ring or Robert Hanssen, the individual showed patterns of spending inconsistent with their salary. Some people with changed spending may have a perfectly good reason, such as an inheritance or even winning the lottery, but such patterns should not be ignored.
Personnel in sensitive positions, who have difficulty getting along with peers, may become risks for being compromised with an approach based on ego. William Kampiles, a low-level worker in the CIA Watch Center, sold, for a small sum, the critical operations manual on the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite. To an interviewer, Kampiles suggested that if someone had noted his "problem"—constant conflicts with supervisors and co-workers—and brought in outside counseling, he might not have stolen the KH-11 manual.[28]
By 1997, the Project Slammer work was being presented at public meetings of the Security Policy Advisory Board.[29] While a funding cut caused the loss of impetus in the mid-nineties, there are research data used throughout the security community. They emphasize the
essential and multi-faceted motivational patterns underlying espionage. Future Slammer analyses will focus on newly developing issues in espionage such as the role of money, the new dimensions of loyalty and what seems to be a developing trend toward economic espionage.
Counter-SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)
Military and security organizations will provide secure communications, and may monitor less secure systems, such as commercial telephones or general Internet connections, to detect inappropriate information being passed through them. Education on the need to use secure communications, and instruction on using them properly so that they do not become vulnerable to specialized technical interception.
Counter-IMINT (Imagery Intelligence)
The basic methods of countering IMINT are to know when the opponent will use imaging against one's own side, and interfering with the taking of images. In some situations, especially in free societies, it must be accepted that public buildings may always be subject to photography or other techniques.
Countermeasures include putting visual shielding over sensitive targets or camouflaging them. When countering such threats as imaging satellites, awareness of the orbits can guide security personnel to stop an activity, or perhaps cover the sensitive parts, when the satellite is overhead. This also applies to imaging on aircraft and UAVs, although the more direct expedient of shooting them down, or attacking their launch and support area, is an option in wartime.
Counter-OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence)
While the concept well precedes the recognition of a discipline of OSINT, the idea of censorship of material directly relevant to national security is a basic OSINT defense. In democratic societies, even in wartime, censorship must be watched carefully lest it violate reasonable freedom of the press, but the balance is set differently in different countries and at different times.
The United Kingdom is generally considered to have a very free press, but there is the DA-Notice, formerly D-notice system. Many British journalists find that the system is used fairly, but there will always be arguments. In the specific context of counterintelligence, note that Peter Wright, a former senior member of the Security Service who left their service without his pension, moved to Australia before publishing his book Spycatcher. While much of the book was reasonable commentary, it revealed some specific and sensitive techniques, such as Operation RAFTER, a means of detecting the existence and setting of radio receivers.
Counter-MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence)
MASINT is mentioned here for completeness, but the discipline contains so varied a range of technologies that a type-by-type strategy is beyond the current scope. One example, however, can draw on the Operation RAFTER technique revealed in Wright's book. With the knowledge that Radiofrequency MASINT was being used to pick up an internal frequency in radio receivers, it would be possible to design a shielded receiver that would not radiate the signal that RAFTER monitored.
Theory of offensive counterintelligence
Offensive techniques in current counterintelligence doctrine are principally directed against human sources, so counterespionage can be considered a synonym for offensive counterintelligence. At the heart of exploitation operations is the objective to degrade the effectiveness of an adversary's intelligence service or a terrorist organization. Offensive counterespionage (and counterterrorism) is done one of two ways, either by manipulating the adversary (FIS or terrorist) in some manner or by disrupting the adversary's normal operations.
Defensive counterintelligence operations that succeed in breaking up a clandestine network by arresting the persons involved or by exposing their actions demonstrate that disruption is quite measurable and effective against FIS if the right actions are taken. If defensive counterintelligence stops terrorist attacks, it has succeeded.
Offensive counterintelligence seeks to damage the long-term capability of the adversary. If it can lead a national adversary into putting large resources into protecting from a nonexistent threat, or if it can lead terrorists to assume that all of their "sleeper" agents in a country have become unreliable and must be replaced (and possibly killed as security risks), there is a greater level of success than can be seen from defensive operations alone, To carry out offensive counterintelligence, however, the service must do more than detect; it must manipulate persons associated with the adversary.
The Canadian Department of National Defence makes some useful logical distinctions in its Directive on its[30] National Counter-Intelligence Unit. The terminology is not the same as used by other services, but the distinctions are useful:
"Counter-intelligence (contre-ingérence) means activities concerned with identifying and counteracting threats to the security of DND employees, CF members, and DND and CF property and information, that are posed by hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities." This corresponds to defensive counterintelligence in other services.
"Security intelligence (renseignement de sécurité) means intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities." This does not (emphasis added) correspond directly to offensive counterintelligence, but is the intelligence preparation necessary to conduct offensive counterintelligence.
The duties of the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit include "identifying, investigating and countering threats to the security of the DND and the CF from espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, and other criminal activity; identifying, investigating and countering the actual or possible compromise of highly classified or special DND or CF material; conducting CI security investigations, operations and security briefings and debriefings to counter threats to, or to preserve, the security of DND and CF interests." This mandate is a good statement of a mandate to conduct offensive counterintelligence.
DND further makes the useful clarification,[31] "The security intelligence process should not be confused with the liaison conducted by members of the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) for the purpose of obtaining criminal intelligence, as the collection of this type of information is within their mandate."
Manipulating an intelligence professional, himself trained in counterintelligence, is no easy task, unless he is already predisposed toward the opposing side. Any effort that does not start with a sympathetic person will take a long-term commitment, and creative thinking to overcome the defenses of someone who knows he is a counterintelligence target and also knows counterintelligence techniques.
Terrorists on the other hand, although they engage in deception as a function of security appear to be more prone to manipulation or deception by a well-placed adversary than are foreign intelligence services. This is in part due to the fact that many terrorist groups, whose members "often mistrust and fight among each other, disagree, and vary in conviction.", are not as internally cohesive as foreign intelligence services, potentially leaving them more vulnerable to both deception and manipulation.
Further reading
Johnson, William R. Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to Be a Counterintelligence Officer (2009)
Ginkel, B. van (2012). "Towards the intelligent use of intelligence: Quis Custodiet ipsos Custodes?". 3 (10). The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
Lee, Newton (2015). Counterterrorism and Cybersecurity: Total Information Awareness (Second ed.). Springer International Publishing Switzerland. ISBN 978-3319172439.
Selby, Scott Andrew. The Axmann Conspiracy: The Nazi Plan for a Fourth Reich and How the U.S. Army Defeated It. Berkley (Penguin), Sept. 2012. ISBN 0425252701
Toward a Theory of CI
See also
Irregular warfare
List of counterintelligence organizations
FBI Counterintelligence Division
SAEDA
The Institute of World Politics
X-2 Counter Espionage Branch
References
Johnson, William (2009). Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to be a Counterintelligence Officer. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. p. 2.
Philip H.J. Davies (2012). Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9781440802812.
Anciens des Services Spéciaux de la Défense Nationale Archived 2016-03-15 at the Wayback Machine ( France )
"Okhrana" literally means "the guard"
Okhrana Britannica Online
Ian D. Thatcher, Late Imperial Russia: problems and prospects, page 50.
"SIS Or MI6. What's in a Name?". SIS website. Archived from the original on 26 September 2008. Retrieved 11 July 2008.
Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of Mi5 (London, 2009), p.21.
Calder Walton (2013). Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire. Overlook. pp. 5–6. ISBN 9781468310436.
Lowenthal, M. (2003). Intelligence: From secrets to policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
"Counterintelligence". FBI. Archived from the original on 2016-07-17.
"COUNTER-ESPIONAGE". Security Service MI5. Archived from the original on 2020-01-15.
Clark, R.M. and Mitchell, W.L., 2018. Deception: Counterdeception and Counterintelligence. CQ Press.
"Counterintelligence Investigations". Retrieved 2008-05-08.
Archick, Kristen (2006-07-24). "European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 2007-11-05.
Dulles, Allen W. (1977). The Craft of Intelligence. Greenwood. ISBN 0-8371-9452-0. Dulles-1977.
Wisner, Frank G. (1993-09-22). "On "The Craft of Intelligence"". CIA-Wisner-1993. Archived from the original on 2007-11-15. Retrieved 2007-11-03.
Matschulat, Austin B. (1996-07-02). "Coordination and Cooperation in Counerintelligence". Archived from the original on 2007-10-10. Retrieved 2007-11-03.
"Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)" (PDF). 2004-04-30. Retrieved 2007-11-03.
"National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)" (PDF). 2007.
Suvorov, Victor (1984). "Chapter 4, Agent Recruiting". Inside Soviet Military Intelligence. MacMillan Publishing Company.
US Department of the Army (1995-10-03). "Field Manual 34–60: Counterintelligence". Retrieved 2007-11-04.
Gleghorn, Todd E. (September 2003). "Exposing the Seams: the Impetus for Reforming US Counterintelligence" (PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-02.
US Department of Defense (2007-07-12). "Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2008-11-23. Retrieved 2007-10-01.
Imbus, Michael T (April 2002). "Identifying Threats: Improving Intelligence and Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection" (PDF). USAFCSC-Imbus-2002. Retrieved 2007-11-03.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2007-06-22). "Joint Publication 2-0: Intelligence" (PDF). US JP 2-0. Retrieved 2007-11-05.
Intelligence Community Staff (12 April 1990). "Project Slammer Interim Progress Report". Retrieved 2007-11-04.
Stein, Jeff (July 5, 1994). "The Mole's Manual". New York Times. Retrieved 2007-11-04.
Security Policy Advisory Board (12 December 1997). "Security Policy Advisory Board Meeting Minutes". Retrieved 2007-11-04. {{cite web}}: |last= has generic name (help)
"Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit". 2003-03-28. Canada-DND-DAOD 8002-2. Archived from the original on 2007-11-21. Retrieved 2007-11-19.
"Security Intelligence Liaison Program". 2003-03-28. Canada-DND-DAOD 8002-3. Archived from the original on 2007-11-30. Retrieved 2007-11-19.
The dark side of history: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/
In espionage parlance, a cutout is a mutually trusted intermediary, method or channel of communication that facilitates the exchange of information between agents. Cutouts usually know only the source and destination of the information to be transmitted, not the identities of any other persons involved in the espionage process (need to know basis). Thus, a captured cutout cannot be used to identify members of an espionage cell. The cutout also isolates the source from the destination, so neither necessarily knows the other.
Outside espionage
Some computer protocols, like Tor, use the equivalent of cutout nodes in their communications networks. The use of multiple layers of encryption usually stops nodes on such networks from knowing the ultimate sender or receiver of the data.
In computer networking, darknets have some cutout functionality. Darknets are distinct from other distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, as sharing is anonymous, i.e., IP addresses are not publicly shared and nodes often forward traffic to other nodes. Thus, with a darknet, users can communicate with little fear of governmental or corporate interference.[1] Darknets are thus often associated with dissident political communications as well as various illegal activities.
A dead drop or dead letter box is a method of espionage tradecraft used to pass items or information between two individuals (e.g., a case officer and an agent, or two agents) using a secret location. By avoiding direct meetings, individuals can maintain operational security. This method stands in contrast to the live drop, so-called because two persons meet to exchange items or information.
Spies and their handlers have been known to perform dead drops using various techniques to hide items (such as money, secrets or instructions) and to signal that the drop has been made. Although the signal and location by necessity must be agreed upon in advance, the signal may or may not be located close to the dead drop itself. The operatives may not necessarily know one another or ever meet.[1][2]
Considerations
The location and nature of the dead drop must enable retrieval of the hidden item without the operatives being spotted by a member of the public, the police, or other security forces—therefore, common everyday items and behavior are used to avoid arousing suspicion. Any hidden location could serve, although often a cut-out device is used, such as a loose brick in a wall, a (cut-out) library book, or a hole in a tree.
Dead drop spike
A dead drop spike is a concealment device similar to a microcache. It has been used since the late 1960s to hide money, maps, documents, microfilm, and other items. The spike is water- and mildew-proof and can be pushed into the ground or placed in a shallow stream to be retrieved at a later time.
Signaling devices can include a chalk mark on a wall, a piece of chewing gum on a lamppost, or a newspaper left on a park bench. Alternatively, the signal can be made from inside the agent's own home, by, for example, hanging a distinctively-colored towel from a balcony, or placing a potted plant on a window sill where it is visible to anyone on the street.
Drawbacks
While the dead drop method is useful in preventing the instantaneous capture of either an operative/handler pair or an entire espionage network, it is not without disadvantages. If one of the operatives is compromised, they may reveal the location and signal for that specific dead drop. Counterintelligence can then use the dead drop as a double agent for a variety of purposes, such as to feed misinformation to the enemy or to identify other operatives using it or ultimately to booby trap it.[3] There is also the risk that a third party may find the material deposited.
Modern techniques
See also: Short-range agent communications
On January 23, 2006, the Russian FSB accused Britain of using wireless dead drops concealed inside hollowed-out rocks ("spy rock") to collect espionage information from agents in Russia. According to the Russian authorities, the agent delivering information would approach the rock and transmit data wirelessly into it from a hand-held device, and later, his British handlers would pick up the stored data by similar means.[4]
SecureDrop, initially called DeadDrop, is a software suite for teams that allows them to create a digital dead drop location to receive tips from whistleblowers through the Internet. The team members and whistleblowers never communicate directly and never know each other's identity, therefore allowing whistleblowers to dead-drop information despite the mass surveillance and privacy violations which had become commonplace in the beginning of the twenty-first century.
See also
Espionage
Foldering
PirateBox
USB dead drop
References
Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, with Henry R. Schlesinger, Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs, from Communism to al-Qaeda, New York, Dutton, 2008. ISBN 0-525-94980-1. Pp. 43-44, 63, and 74-76.
Jack Barth, International Spy Museum Handbook of Practical Spying, Washington DC, National Geographic, 2004. ISBN 978-0-7922-6795-9. Pp. 119-125.
Wettering, Frederick L. (2001-07-01). "The Internet and the Spy Business". International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 14 (3): 342–365. doi:10.1080/08850600152386846. ISSN 0885-0607. S2CID 153870872.
Nick Paton Walsh, The Guardian (23 January 2006). "Moscow names British 'spies' in NGO row". TheGuardian.com. Archived from the original on 29 August 2013. Retrieved 8 April 2012.
Bibliography
"Russians accuse 4 Britons of spying".International Herald Tribune. January 24, 2006. News report on Russian discovery of British "wireless dead drop".
"Old spying lives on in new ways". BBC. 23 January 2006.
Madrid suspects tied to e-mail ruse. International Herald Tribune. April 28, 2006.
Military secrets missing on Ministry of Defence computer files
Robert Burnson, "Accused Chinese spy pleads guilty in U.S. 'dead-drop' sting", Bloomberg, 25 novembre 2019[1].
Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, with Henry R. Schlesinger, Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs, from Communism to al-Qaeda, New York, Dutton, 2008. ISBN 0-525-94980-1.
The hidden history of the United States: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/
In the conclusive chapter of this revealing series, we delve deeper into the mechanisms of elite control within the economic framework. Discover the intricacies of how stock ownership and shared directorates create an interconnected web, particularly among ruling class banks and insurance companies, solidifying their dominance.
Explore a comprehensive assessment of wealth and income distribution in the nation, shedding light on the disparities that underscore the power dynamics. Unveil the role and significance of mass media within this structure, highlighting how elite-controlled media operate as a critical component of the system of control.
Delve into the nuanced examination of election control and gain insights from a review of "Trading with the Enemy." Witness a thought-provoking segment from "America/from Hitler to MX," exposing the paradoxical involvement of American economic institutions aiding Axis powers during World War II while the US was engaged in combat against them.
As the finale approaches, witness a concise exploration into actionable steps toward fostering genuine democracy within the United States. Join us in this thought-provoking conclusion as we ponder the pathways to a more equitable and democratic future.
The dark side of history: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/
Louis Patrick Gray III (July 18, 1916 – July 6, 2005) was acting director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from May 3, 1972, to April 27, 1973. During this time, the FBI was in charge of the initial investigation into the burglaries that sparked the Watergate scandal, which eventually led to the resignation of President Nixon. Gray was nominated as permanent Director by Nixon on February 15, 1973, but failed to win Senate confirmation.[3] He resigned as Acting FBI director on April 27, 1973, after he admitted to destroying documents that had come from convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt's safe—documents received on June 28, 1972, 11 days after the Watergate burglary, and given to Gray by White House counsel John Dean.[4]
Gray remained publicly silent about the Watergate scandal for 32 years, speaking to the press only once, near the end of his life; this was shortly after Gray's direct subordinate at the FBI, FBI Deputy Director Mark Felt, revealed himself to have been the secret source to The Washington Post known as "Deep Throat".
Early life and education
Gray was born on July 18, 1916, in St. Louis, Missouri, the eldest son of Louis Patrick Gray Jr., a Texas railroad worker. He worked three jobs while attending schools in St. Louis and Houston, Texas, graduating from St. Thomas High School in 1932, at the age of 16 (having skipped two grades). Gray initially attended Rice University; however, his true goal was to be admitted to the United States Naval Academy. He was finally admitted to the Naval Academy in 1936 and he immediately dropped out of Rice University in his senior year so he could attend.
At the time, however, Gray could not afford the bus or train fare to Annapolis, so he hired on as an apprentice seaman on a tramp steamer out of Galveston. During the journey to Philadelphia (the closest the steamer could get him to Maryland), Gray taught calculus to the ship's captain, a Bulgarian named Frank Solis, in return for basic lessons in navigation. Once in Philadelphia, Gray hitchhiked to Annapolis.[5]
Once at the academy, Gray walked onto the football team as the starting quarterback, played varsity lacrosse and boxed as a light heavyweight. In 1940, Gray received a Bachelor of Science degree from the Naval Academy.
Naval career
The United States Navy commissioned Gray as a line officer, and he served through five submarine war patrols in the Pacific Ocean theater of World War II. He suffered a ruptured appendix at the start of his sixth patrol and was unable to get to a hospital for 17 days, an ordeal that should have killed him.[6] In 1945, Gray visited Beatrice Castle Kirk (1923–2019), the widow of his Naval Academy classmate, Lieutenant Commander Edward Emmet DeGarmo (1917–1945). They were married in 1946. He adopted her two sons, Alan and Ed; and they had two of their own, Patrick and Stephen.[6]
In 1949, Gray received a Juris Doctor degree from George Washington University Law School, where he edited the law review and became a member of the Order of the Coif. He was admitted to practice before the Washington, D.C., Bar in 1949; later, he was admitted to practice law by the Connecticut State Bar, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the United States courts of appeals, the United States Court of Claims, and the Supreme Court of the United States.[7]
By 1960, Gray's achievements in the Navy included commanding the U.S.S. Tiru (SS-416) and two other submarines on war patrols during the Korean War; earning the rank of captain two years before he was legally allowed to be paid for it; and serving as congressional liaison officer for the United States Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. He indicated his desire to retire from the Navy, but Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke told him, "If you stay, you'll have my job some day."[6] He did not stay, but joined a Connecticut law firm in 1961.
Department of Justice
In 1969, Gray returned to the federal government and worked under the Nixon administration in several different positions. In 1970, President Nixon appointed him as Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division in the Department of Justice. In 1972, Gray was nominated to be Deputy Attorney General, but before he could be confirmed by the full United States Senate his nomination was withdrawn.
Acting Director of FBI
Instead, President Nixon designated him as Acting Director of the FBI after the death of J. Edgar Hoover. Gray served for less than a year. Day-to-day operational command of the Bureau remained with Associate Director Mark Felt.
Watergate involvement
Watergate scandal
The Watergate complex in 2006
Events
List
People
Watergate burglars
Groups
CRP
White House
Judiciary
Journalists
Intelligence community
Mark Felt ("Deep Throat") L. Patrick Gray Richard Helms James R. Schlesinger
Congress
Related
vte
Watergate and the FBI's investigation
On June 17, 1972, just six weeks after Gray took office at the FBI, five men were arrested after breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate hotel complex in Washington, D.C.
Gray first learned of the Watergate break-ins on June 17 from Wes Grapp, the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles field office. Gray immediately called Mark Felt, his second in command. At the time, Felt only had limited information, remaining unclear as to whether it was a burglary or bombing attempt.[8]
Felt had more information the next day, when he informed Gray that the burglars had connections to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CRP), that one burglar (McCord) was head of security for the committee, and that at least one listening device had been found. Gray recalled the conversation concluding with the exchange:
"Are you absolutely certain that we have jurisdiction?" I asked.
"I'm sure of it," he [Felt] answered.
"Just check it and be absolutely certain," I ordered. "And then investigate it to the hilt with no holds barred."[9]
On the same day, June 18, 1972, Gray also met later-identified Watergate conspirator Fred LaRue in California. The two discussed Watergate, according to LaRue, and made arrangements to meet again back in Washington, D.C.[10] In his own memoir, Gray relates the LaRue meeting as a chance encounter at a hotel swimming pool and quotes their entire Watergate-related conversation:
"The Watergate thing is a hell of a thing," he said.
"You bet it is, Fred," I answered. "We're going to investigate the hell out of it."
That was all either of us said about it.[11]
For the first six months of the investigation, Gray remained heavily involved. It was only when it became apparent that the White House was involved that Gray recused himself from the investigation and handed control over to Mark Felt.[12]
Cover-up
On June 23, 1972, White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman and President Nixon held one of the infamous "smoking gun" conversations in which they conspired to use the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to block the FBI investigation into the money trail leading from the Watergate burglars to the Committee to Re-elect the President, which would constitute hard evidence that Committee members were involved in the planning of the burglaries.
According to Gray, this plan was first put into action when he had a meeting with Vernon Walters, then deputy director of the CIA, in which he quotes Walters as falsely saying, "If the investigation gets pushed further south of the border… it could trespass onto some of our covert projects. Since you've got these five men under arrest, it will be best to taper the matter off here." This conversation implicitly stated that the FBI should not interview Manuel Ogarrio and Kenneth Dahlberg, individuals connected with the money used to fund the Watergate burglars.[13]
This would later be backed up by the Director of the CIA, Richard Helms, when he specifically told Gray that Karl Wagner and John Caswell should also not be interviewed, as they were, he stated, active CIA agents at the time.[14]
The basis for such a request came from a long-standing understanding between the CIA and the FBI that they would not reveal each other's informants. This effort by the White House and the CIA succeeded in delaying the interviews of both Ogarrio and Dahlberg for a little more than one week, at which point Gray and his senior FBI staff, including Mark Felt, Charlie Bates, and Bob Kunkel, decided that, due to the increasing importance of these individuals in the investigation, they needed a written request from the CIA not to interview them, which would have to state in greater detail the reasons for not interviewing these individuals. Once the decision was made, Gray called Vernon Walters and demanded that written request the next morning, or he would order the interviews to go forth.[15]
The next morning, Vernon Walters arrived and delivered a three-page memorandum, marked "SECRET", that did not ask the FBI to hold off on the interviews. The meeting concluded with Walters suggesting to Gray that he should warn the President that some members of the White House staff were hindering the FBI's investigation. After the conversation, Gray ordered the interviews to proceed immediately.[16]
Ultimately, the CIA cover-up delayed the FBI investigation no more than two weeks.
While not active in any Watergate activities per se, Gray was aware through his dealings with John Dean that the White House was concerned about what might be discovered from a full-field FBI investigation and explored what he could do to limit the investigation or shift it away from the Bureau's jurisdiction.[17] As Dean wrote in his Watergate memoir "Blind Ambition," he used Gray as a shill knowing that "we could count on Pat Gray to keep the Hunt material from becoming public, and he did not disappoint us."[18] In fact, even though he thought of this as a political not criminal situation and that he was ultimately serving the President as the "nation's chief law enforcement officer," Gray would come dangerously close to collusion because he chose to be useful to the White House without asking the hard questions. Dean goes on to say, "I met Pat Gray secretly at his home in southwest Washington. We were both apprehensive about the meeting as we walked to a park and sat down on a bench overlooking the Potomac, discussing my request to obtain FBI 302s and AirTels on the Watergate investigation."[18]
Felt and the search for the source
The Nixon White House tapes reveal that Bob Haldeman told Nixon that Felt was the source of leaks of confidential information contained in the FBI's investigation to various members of the press, including Bob Woodward of The Washington Post. Gray claimed that he resisted five separate demands from the White House to fire Felt, stating that he believed Felt's assurances that he was not the source. Eventually, Gray demanded to know who was claiming Felt to be leaking. Attorney general Richard Kleindienst told Gray that Roswell Gilpatric, former deputy secretary of defense under John F. Kennedy and now outside general counsel to Time, had told John Mitchell that Felt was leaking to Sandy Smith of Time magazine.[19][20]
After Felt admitted in the May 2005 Vanity Fair article that he lied to Gray about leaking to the press, Gray claimed that Felt's bitterness at being passed over was the cause of his decision to leak to Time, The Washington Post, and others.[21]
Confirmation hearings
In 1973, Gray was nominated as Hoover's permanent successor as head of the FBI. This action by President Nixon confounded many, coming at a time when revelations of involvement by Nixon administration officials in the Watergate scandal were coming to the forefront. Under Gray's direction, the FBI had been accused of mishandling the investigation into the break-in, doing a cursory job and refusing to investigate the possible involvement of administration officials. Gray's Senate confirmation hearing was to become the Senate's first opportunity to ask pertinent questions about the Watergate investigation.
During the confirmation hearing, Gray defended his bureau's investigation. During questioning, he volunteered that he had provided copies of some of the files on the investigation to White House Counsel John Dean, who had told Gray he was conducting an investigation for the President.[22] Gray testified that before turning over the files to Dean, he had been advised by the FBI's own legal counsel that he was required by law to comply with Dean's order. He confirmed that the FBI investigation supported claims made by The Washington Post and other sources, about dirty tricks committed and funded by the Committee to Re-Elect the President, and in particular, activities of questionable legality committed by Donald Segretti. The White House had for months steadfastly denied any involvement in such activities.
During the hearings, Gray testified that Dean had "probably lied" to the FBI,[23] increasing the suspicions of many of a cover-up. The Nixon administration was so angered by this statement that John Ehrlichman told John Dean that Gray should be left to "twist slowly, slowly in the wind."
Destruction of documents and resignation from the FBI
On June 21, 1972, Gray met with John Dean and John Ehrlichman in Ehrlichman's office. During this meeting, Gray was handed several envelopes full of documents from the personal safe of E. Howard Hunt. Dean instructed Gray, in the presence of John Ehrlichman, that the documents were "national security documents. These should never see the light of day."[24] Dean further repeatedly told Gray that the documents were not Watergate-related.
Six months later, Gray said he finally looked at the papers as he burned them in a Connecticut fireplace. "The first set of papers in there were false top-secret cables indicating that the Kennedy administration had much to do with the assassination of the Vietnamese president (Diem)," Gray said. "The second set of papers in there were letters purportedly written by Senator Kennedy involving some of his peccadilloes, if you will."[4]
After learning from Ehrlichman that John Dean was cooperating with the U.S. attorney and would be revealing to him what happened on June 21, Gray told his staunchest congressional supporter, Senator Lowell Weicker, so that he might be prepared for that revelation. As a result, Senator Weicker leaked this revelation to some chosen reporters.[25]
Following this revelation, Gray was forced to resign from the FBI on April 27, 1973.[26]
Legal struggles
For the next eight years, Gray defended his actions as Acting Director of the FBI, testifying before five federal grand juries and four committees of Congress.[27]
On October 7, 1975, the Watergate Special Prosecutor informed Gray that the last Watergate-related investigation of him had been formally closed.[28] Gray was never indicted in relation to Watergate, but the scandal dogged him afterwards.
In 1978, Gray was indicted, along with Assistant Director Edward Miller, for allegedly having approved illegal break-ins during the Nixon administration. Gray vehemently denied the charges, which were dropped in 1980. Felt and Miller, who had approved the illegal break-ins during the tenures of four separate FBI directors, including Hoover, Gray, William Ruckelshaus, and Clarence M. Kelley, were convicted and later pardoned by President Ronald Reagan. Exonerated by the Department of Justice after a two-year investigation,[29][30][31] Gray returned to his law practice in Connecticut.
Later life
After his time in Washington, Gray returned to practicing law at the firm of Suisman, Shapiro, Wool, Brennan, Gray & Greenberg (SSWBGG) in New London, Connecticut.[32]
In a 2005 Vanity Fair article,[33] Deputy Director Mark Felt claimed to be Deep Throat, the infamous source of leaks to Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein.[34] Woodward, Bernstein, and Post executive editor Benjamin C. Bradlee confirmed the claim.[35][36] Gray spoke about the Watergate scandal for the first time in 32 years on June 26, 2005, ten days before his death from pancreatic cancer. He told ABC's This Week that he was in "total shock, total disbelief" when asked about Felt's claim. "It was like I was hit with a tremendous sledgehammer."[37]
Gray died on July 6, 2005.[38] He was working on his memoirs with his stepson Edward Gray, using his extensive and never-released personal Watergate files. His stepson finished the book In Nixon's Web: A Year in the Crosshairs of Watergate,[39] which disputes the claim that Felt was Deep Throat, citing Woodward's own notes and other evidence as proof that Deep Throat was a fictional composite made up of several Woodward sources, only one of whom was Felt.[40]
Gray and the New York Times
In 2009, Bob Phelps, a former editor of The New York Times, and Robert M. Smith, a former reporter for the Times, claimed that they had received information from Gray that would have allowed the Times to break the Watergate story before The Washington Post, but they failed to act upon it.[41]
In August 1972, Gray and Smith had lunch. According to Smith, during this lunch Gray mentioned details of Donald Segretti and John Mitchell's involvement in the Watergate burglaries. Smith quotes Gray:
"[Gray] told me about a guy who burned his palm, and about Donald Segretti (by name).
And when he intimated over the entrée that the wrongdoing went further, I leaned back against the wall on my inside banquette and looked at him in frank astonishment.
"The attorney general?" I asked.
He nodded.
I paused.
"The president?" I asked.
He looked me in the eye without denial—or any comment. In other words, confirmation.[42]
After the lunch, Smith reportedly rushed to his editor, Phelps, with the story, but it amounted to nothing. Smith left his job the next day for Yale Law School, and Phelps lost track of the story while covering the 1972 Republican Convention.
However, while only Gray and Smith knew exactly what was said at that lunch, Gray's son, Edward, denies that his father could have implicated either the Attorney General or the President, stating:
The truth is that at the time of this luncheon—as my father testified multiple times under oath—neither he nor anyone else in the FBI had any evidence whatsoever that the president was involved.[43]
Gray goes on to point out that at the time of this lunch the Attorney General was Richard Kleindienst, who was never implicated in any of the Watergate scandals. Even if Smith meant that he was talking about John Mitchell, the former Attorney General, Gray further points out that no one (outside of the conspirators) knew of Mitchell's involvement until the following April, when John Dean admitted as much to special prosecutors.[43]
Documents
Gray was a meticulous record-keeper, which is most easily evidenced by the 40 boxes of personal records he took with him from his year with the FBI.[44] The archive would grow even after Gray left the FBI as a direct result of the legal proceedings in which he was forced to take part in the years to follow.
This archive has become what is undoubtedly the "most complete set of Watergate investigative records outside the government."[45]
Selected Navy awards
American Defense Service Medal
American Campaign Medal
Asiatic–Pacific Campaign Medal
World War II Victory Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Korean Service Medal
United Nations Korea Medal
See also
World War II portalBiography portal
Helen Gandy
Notes
Kessler, Ronald (2003). The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI. Macmillan. p. 29. ISBN 0-312-98977-6.
Gray, L. Patrick (March 3, 2009). In Nixon's Web: A Year in the Crosshairs of Watergate. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-0805089189. "He [L. Patrick Gray III] was a lifelong Republican, but Richard Nixon considered him a threat"
NYT1 1973
Page 3 of 3 (June 26, 2005). "Page 3: 'Deep Throat's' Ex-Boss Shocked by Revelation - ABC News". Abcnews.go.com. Retrieved May 17, 2012.
Gray III & Gray 2008, pp. xix–xx
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. xx
FBI 2008
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. 59
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. 60
Emery 1995, p. 157
Gray III & Gray 2008, pp. 60–61
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. 65
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. 72
USG 1974, p. 463
Gray III & Gray 2008, pp. 85–87
Gray III & Gray 2008, pp. 88–89
Haldeman, H.R., The Haldeman Diaries, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1994, 474-75.
Dean, John, Blind Ambition, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976, 122.
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. 133
The claim by Gray that Roswell Gilpatric had informed John Mitchell about Felt being the leaker was called "far-fetched" by the deceased Gilpatric's son, John. John Gilpatric told The New York Times that his father never mentioned knowing John Mitchell. However, a tape in the Oval Office has Nixon telling Gray that the source for this accusation was "a lawyer... for Time." For more on this question, see Roswell Gilpatric
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. 280
Sussman 1974, pp. 165–166
Sussman 1974, p. 173
Gray III & Gray 2008, pp. 81–82
Gray III & Gray 2008, pp. 238–243
Sullivan, Patricia. "Watergate-Era FBI Chief L. Patrick Gray III Dies at 88", Washington Post (July 7, 2005): "Mr. Gray, a Nixon loyalist often described as a political naif, finally was forced to resign April 27, 1973...."
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. xxi
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. 267
Gray III & Gray 2008, pp. 265–267
CHTribune 1980
UPI (December 30, 1980). "Exonerated Gray says he'll sue government". The Bulletin. Retrieved March 31, 2010.[permanent dead link]
Purdum, Todd S. (July 7, 2005). "L. Patrick Gray III, Who Led the F.B.I. During Watergate, Dies at 88". The New York Times. Retrieved December 12, 2014.
O'Connor 2005
"W. Mark Felt Reveals Himself as Deep Throat, Ends Years of Post-Watergate Speculation". Vanity Fair. October 17, 2006.
Woodward, Bob. The Secret Man: The Story of Watergate's Deep Throat, Simon & Schuster, 2005. ISBN 0-7432-8715-0
"The Watergate Story | Deep Throat Revealed - The Washington Post". The Washington Post.
NYT3 2005, p. B4
HIGH 2008
Stout, David (March 9, 2008). "Ex-F.B.I. Chief's Book Revisits Watergate". The New York Times.
Gray III & Gray 2008, pp. 289–302
NYT4 2009
AJRSmith 2009
AJRGray 2009
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. 303
Gray III & Gray 2008, p. 304
References
Biographical entry, St. Thomas High School Hall of Honor, archived from the original on May 12, 2008, retrieved July 2, 2008
Emery, Fred (1995), Watergate: The Corruption of American Politics and the Fall of Richard Nixon, Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-684-81323-8
Directors, Then and Now, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, archived from the original on August 13, 2008, retrieved August 7, 2008
Gray III, L. Patrick; Gray, Ed (2008), In Nixon's Web: A Year in the Crosshairs of Watergate, Times Books/Henry Holt, ISBN 978-0-8050-8256-2
O'Connor, John D. (July 2005), "I'm the Guy They Called Deep Throat", Vanity Fair, retrieved July 2, 2008
Simeone, John; Jacobs, David (2003), Complete Idiot's Guide to the FBI, Alpha Books (published 2002), ISBN 0-02-864400-X
Theoharis, Athan G. (2000), The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide, New York: Checkmark Books, ISBN 0-8160-4228-4
Woodward, Bob (2005), The Secret Man: The Story of Watergate's Deep Throat, Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-7432-8715-0
Sussman, Barry (1974), The Great Cover-up: Nixon and the Scandal of Watergate, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, ISBN 0-690-00729-9
United States Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary (1974), Statement of information : hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, second session, pursuant to H. Res. 803, a resolution authorizing and directing the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America. May–June 1974 (Book II), U.S. Government Printing Office
Johnston, David (June 27, 2005), "Ex-F.B.I. Chief Calls Deep Throat's Unmasking a Shock", New York Times, retrieved March 21, 2009
Rugaber, Walter (April 28, 1973), "A Sudden Decision: Chief Resigns After Citing Reports He Destroyed Files", New York Times, retrieved March 21, 2009
Crewdson, John (April 6, 1973), "Nixon Withdraws Gray Nomination as F.B.I. Director", New York Times, retrieved March 21, 2009
Perez-Pena, Richard (May 24, 2009), "2 Ex-Timesmen Say They Had a Tip on Watergate First", New York Times, retrieved May 31, 2009
Smith, Robert (May 26, 2009), "Before Deep Throat", American Journalism Review, retrieved June 1, 2009
Gray, Edward (May 28, 2009), "Taking Issue", American Journalism Review, retrieved June 1, 2009
"Court Clears ex-FBI Chief", The Chicago Tribune, December 12, 1980
External links
Louis Patrick Gray, III, www.fbi.gov.
L. Patrick Gray, Deep Throat's Boss at F.B.I., Dies at 88. New York Times, July 6, 2005.
Ex-F.B.I. Chief Calls Deep Throat's Unmasking a Shock. New York Times, June 27, 2005.
'Deep Throat's' Ex-Boss Shocked by Revelation. ABC News This Week, June 26, 2005.
Obituary. Seattle Times, July 7, 2005.
White House Tapes relating to FBI. National Security Archives, July 2, 2008.
Biographical entry. St. Thomas High School Hall of Honor, July 2, 2008.
Ed Gray on "Morning Joe." MSNBC, March 7, 2008.
Ex-F.B.I. Chief's Book Revisits Watergate New York Times, March 9, 2008.
In Nixon's Web: Watergate and the FBI
Gray in Black and White Archived June 2, 2009, at the Wayback Machine. The American Spectator, June 2008.
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John O'Beirne Ranelagh is a television executive and producer, and an author of history and of current politics. He was created a Knight First Class by King Harald V of Norway in 2013 in the Royal Norwegian Order of Merit, for outstanding service in the interest of Norway.
Ranelagh was born in New York and moved to rural Ireland following his parents’ 1946 marriage.[1]
Education
He read Modern History at Christ Church, Oxford, and went on to take a Ph.D. at Eliot College, University of Kent.
Career
He was Campaign Director for "Outset", a charity for the single homeless person, where he pioneered the concept of charity auctions. From 1974 to 1979 he was at the Conservative Research Department where he first had responsibility for Education policy, and then for Foreign policy. He started his career in television with the British Broadcasting Corporation, first for BBC News and Current Affairs on Midweek. As Associate Producer he was a key member of the BBC/RTE Ireland: A Television History 13-part documentary series (1981). Later a member of the team that started Channel 4, he conceived the Equinox program,[2] developed the "commissioning system", and served as Board Secretary. He was the first television professional appointed to the Independent Television Commission (ITC), a government agency which licensed and regulated commercial television in Britain from 1991 to 2003.[3]
Eventually Ranelagh relocated to Scandinavia where he continued in television broadcasting.[4] There he has been with various companies: as Executive Chairman for NordicWorld; as Director for Kanal 2 Estonia; and, as Deputy Chief Executive and Director of Programmes for TV2 Denmark. Later Ranelagh worked at TV2 Norway as Director of Acquisition, and at Vizrt as deputy Chairman and then Chairman .[5]
Ranelagh stood as the Conservative Party candidate in Caerphilly in the 1979 general election. He stood for the seat of Bethnal Green and Bow in the 1977 Greater London Council election.[6]
Books
Ranelagh has also written several books:[7]
"The I.R.B. from the Treaty to 1924," in Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 20, No. 77 (March 1976).
"Science and Education," CRD, 1977.
"Human Rights and Foreign Policy," with Richard Luce, CPC, 1978.
Ireland. An illustrated history (Oxford University 1981);
A Short History of Ireland (Cambridge University 1983, 2d ed. 1995, 3d ed. 2012);
The Agency. The rise and decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster 1986, pb. ed. 1987);
"Secrets, Supervision and Information," in Freedom of Information; Freedom of the Individual, ed. Julia Neuberger, 1987.
"The Irish Republican Brotherhood in the revolutionary period, 1879–1923," in The Revolution in Ireland, 1879–1923, ed. D.G. Boyce, 1988.
Den Anden Kanal, Tiderne Skifter, 1989.
Thatcher's People. An insider's account of the politics, the power and the personalities (HarperCollins 1991);
CIA: A History (London: BBC Books, illustrated edition 1992).
Encyclopædia Britannica, "Ireland," 1993–
"Through the Looking Glass: A comparison of United States and United Kingdom Intelligence cultures," in In the Name of Intelligence, eds. Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, 1998.
"Channel 4: A view from within," in The making of Channel 4, ed. Peter Catterall, 1998.
Family
John Ranelagh's Irish father was James O'Beirne Ranelagh (died 1979 Cambridge) who had been in the IRA in 1916 and later, fighting on the Republican side in the 1922–24 Civil War. His mother was Elaine (née Lambert Lewis). She had been a young American folklorist with her own WNYC radio program,[8] and thereafter became the noted author, E. L. Ranelagh (born 1914 New York, died 1996 London).[9] A native New Yorker, she had moved to rural Ireland following her 1946 marriage to James. Their son John Ranelagh, who has three younger sisters, Bawn, Elizabeth and Fionn, was born in 1947.[10] His wife is Elizabeth Grenville Hawthorne, author of Managing Grass for Horses (2005). Hawthorne is the daughter of the late Sir William Hawthorne.
See also
Channel 4
Equinox
TV2 Norway
Notes
"The Irish Republican Brotherhood 1914 – 1924". Irish Academic Press. Retrieved 6 August 2024.
Equinox ran from 1986 to 2001 and presented science features and documentaries.
Speaker Bio John Ranelagh at natpe.2014 Archived 2011-05-15 at the Wayback Machine.
Video Snack with John Ranelagh, TV2 Norway.
Speaker Bio John Ranelagh at natpe.2014 Archived 2011-05-15 at the Wayback Machine.
"Greater London Council Election" (PDF). 5 May 1977. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 August 2013. Retrieved 23 July 2023.
His The Agency (1986), won the National Intelligence Book Prize, was a New York Times Notable Book of the Year, and was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize. In 2000 the Washington Post listed it as one if the ten best books on Intelligence in the twentieth century. To the present day it is recommended reading for students of Intelligence. He is also the author of two books on the history of Ireland, one of which – "A Short History of Ireland" – has been in constant print since 1983.Amazon's John Ranelagh page
Broadcasting from New York City, her show featured folk songs. In the late 1930s she helped introduce the blues of Huddie Ledbetter to radio audiences.
Among the books of E. L. Ranelagh: Himself and I (New York: Citadel 1957), under the pen-name Anne O'Neill-Barna; The Past We Share. The near eastern ancestry of western folk literature (London: Quartet 1979); Men on Women (London: Quartet 1985), a history of gender relations. Later, she also published paperbacks on "Rugby Jokes".
Obituaries: Elaine O'Beirne-Ranelagh
External links
Exclusive Interview with John O'Beirne Ranelagh
Video Snack with John Ranelagh, TV2 Norway
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Secret history of the CIA: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/
Featuring a diverse array of voices, including intellectual powerhouse Dr. Noam Chomsky, prolific author Dr. William Domhoff, former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and the astute perspectives of former Congressman Ron Paul, among others, this series delves into the multifaceted layers of power shaping the nation.
The inaugural segment meticulously dissects the ruling class institutions that wield immense influence, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Bilderbergers, and Trilateral Commission. It unveils how these entities, irrespective of political affiliations, intricately steer US economic and political landscapes. Through an astute examination of personnel and policies, the program elucidates how these entities exert control, transcending the boundaries of Democrat or Republican administrations.
Unraveling the intricate interplay of power and policy, this episode serves as an eye-opening journey into the unseen forces governing the American socio-political sphere.
George William "Bill" Domhoff (born August 6, 1936) is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus and research professor of psychology and sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and a founding faculty member of UCSC's Cowell College.[1][2] He is best known as the author of several best-selling sociology books,[3] including Who Rules America? and its seven subsequent editions (1967 through 2022).[4]
Biography
Early life
Domhoff was born in Youngstown, Ohio, and raised in Rocky River, 12 miles from Cleveland. His parents were George William Domhoff Sr., a loan executive, and Helen S. (Cornett) Domhoff, a secretary at George Sr.'s company.
In high school, Domhoff was a three-sport athlete (in baseball, basketball, and football), wrote for his school newspaper's sports section, served on student council, and won a contest to be the batboy for the Cleveland Indians. He graduated as co-valedictorian.[2]
Education
Domhoff received a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology at Duke University (1958), where he finished freshman year tenth in his class, wrote for the Duke Chronicle, played baseball as an outfielder, and tutored the student athletes. As an undergraduate, he also wrote for The Durham Sun and received his Phi Beta Kappa key.[2] He later earned a Master of Arts degree in psychology at Kent State University (1959), and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in psychology at the University of Miami (1962).[5]
Family
Domhoff has four children. His son-in-law was a Major League Baseball player, Glenallen Hill.[2][6]
Career
Academia
Domhoff was an assistant professor of psychology at California State University, Los Angeles, for three years in the early 1960s. In 1965, he joined the founding faculty[7] of the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), as an assistant professor at Cowell College. He became an associate professor in 1969, a professor in 1976, and a Distinguished Professor in 1993. After his retirement in 1994, he has continued to publish and teach classes as a research professor.[2][8]
Over the course of his career at UCSC, Domhoff served in many capacities at various times: acting dean of the Division of Social Sciences,[9] chair of the Sociology Department, chair of the Academic Senate, chair of the Committee on Academic Personnel, and chair of the Statewide Committee on Preparatory Education.[2] In 2007, he received the University of California's Constantine Panunzio Distinguished Emeriti Award, which honors the post-retirement contributions of UC faculty.[10]
Sociology
Domhoff's first book, Who Rules America? (1967), was a 1960s sociological best-seller.[2] It argues that the United States is dominated by an elite ownership class both politically and economically.[11] This work was partially inspired by Domhoff's experience of the Civil Rights Movement and projects that he assigned for his social psychology courses to map how different organizations were connected.[2] It built on E. Digby Baltzell's 1958 book Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class, C. Wright Mills' 1956 book The Power Elite, Robert A. Dahl's 1961 book Who Governs? and Paul Sweezy work on interest groups, and Floyd Hunter's 1953 book Community Power Structure and 1957 book Top Leadership, USA.
Who Rules was followed by a series of sociology and power structure books like C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite (1968), Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats (1974), and three more best-sellers: The Higher Circles (1970), The Powers That Be (1979), and Who Rules America Now? (1983).[2]
Domhoff has written seven updates to Who Rules America? Every edition has been used as a sociology textbook. He also has a "Who Rules America?" website, hosted by UCSC.[12]
Psychology
In addition to his work in sociology, Domhoff has been a pioneer in the scientific study of dreams.[13][14] In the 1960s, he worked closely with Calvin S. Hall, who had developed a content analysis system for dreams. He has continued to study dreams, and his latest research advocates a neurocognitive basis for future dream research.[15][16]
He and his research partner, Adam Schneider, maintain two websites dedicated to quantitative dream research: DreamResearch.net and DreamBank.net.[14]
Selected bibliography
Who Rules America?
1967. Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
1983. Who Rules America Now? A View for the 80's. New York: Simon and Schuster.
1998. Who Rules America? Power and Politics in the Year 2000. 3rd Edition. Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield Publishing Co.
2002. Who Rules America? Power and Politics. 4th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
2006. Who Rules America? Power, Politics, and Social Change. 5th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
2010. Who Rules America? Challenges to Corporate and Class Dominance. 6th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
2014. Who Rules America? The Triumph of the Corporate Rich.. 7th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
2022. Who Rules America? The Corporate Rich, White Nationalist Republicans, and Inclusionary Democrats in the 2020s. 8th Edition. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Dreams
1996. Finding Meaning in Dreams: A Quantitative Approach. New York: Plenum Publishing.
2003. The Scientific Study of Dreams: Neural Networks, Cognitive Development, and Content Analysis. Washington: American Psychological Association Press.
2018. The Emergence of Dreaming: Mind-Wandering, Embodied Simulation, and the Default Network. New York: Oxford University Press.
2022. The Neurocognitive Theory of Dreaming: The Where, How, When, What, and Why of Dreams. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
References
"Psychology Faculty". University of California at Santa Cruz. Retrieved 16 December 2019.
Domhoff, G. William (February 13, 2014). "G. William Domhoff: The Adventures and Regrets of a Professor of Dreams and Power". University of California.
Gans, H. (1997). "Best-sellers by sociologists: An exploratory study". Contemporary Sociology. 26 (2): 131–135. doi:10.2307/2076741. JSTOR 2076741.
Seidman, Derek. ""Who Rules America?" After 50 Years: An Interview with Professor G. William Domhoff". Eyes on the Ties (LittleSis). Retrieved 16 December 2019.
Domhoff, p.209 in Class in America: An Encyclopedia. by Robert E. Weir ABC-CLIO, 2007
"Sunday, Dec. 3, 1995 C-7. Weddings, Engagements, Anniversaries". Santa Cruz Sentinel. December 3, 1995.
"G. William (Bill) Domhoff, founding faculty, and psychologist Calvin S. Hall, at the Cowell College fountain". UCSC. 1968. Archived from the original on 2017-09-16. Retrieved 2017-06-12.
Domhoff, G. William. "G. William Domhoff: Power Structure Research retrospective (1994)." YouTube.
"William (Bill) Domhoff, dean of the division of social sciences". UCSC. Archived from the original on 2017-12-29. Retrieved 2017-06-12.
"UCSC's Michael Nauenberg wins UC distinguished emeriti award". Santa Cruz Sentinel. 8 May 2013. Retrieved 16 December 2019.
World of Sociology. Gale. November 2000. ISBN 978-0-7876-4965-4.
"Who Rules America?"
"Keynote Speakers: 2017 Annual International Dream Conference". International Association for the Study of Dreams.
King, Philip; Bulkeley, Kelly; Welt, Bernard (2011). Dreaming in the Classroom: Practices, Methods, and Resources in Dream Education. SUNY Press. p. 245.
Domhoff, G. William (2018). The Emergence of Dreaming: Mind-Wandering, Embodied Simulation, and the Default Network. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190673420.
Domhoff, G. William (2022). The Neurocognitive Theory of Dreaming. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 9780262544214.
William Ramsey Clark (December 18, 1927 – April 9, 2021) was an American lawyer, activist, and federal government official. A progressive, New Frontier liberal,[1] he occupied senior positions in the United States Department of Justice under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, serving as United States Attorney General from 1967 to 1969; previously, he was Deputy Attorney General from 1965 to 1967 and Assistant Attorney General from 1961 to 1965.
As attorney general, Clark was known for his vigorous opposition to the death penalty, aggressive support of civil liberties and civil rights, and dedication to enforcing United States antitrust laws.[2] Clark supervised the drafting of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Civil Rights Act of 1968.
After leaving public office, Clark led many progressive activism campaigns, including opposition to the War on Terror. He offered advice or legal defense to such prominent figures as Charles Taylor, Slobodan Milošević, Saddam Hussein, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and Lyndon LaRouche.[3] Until his death in 2021, Clark was the last surviving member of the cabinet of Lyndon B. Johnson.[4]
Early life and career
Clark was born in Dallas, Texas, on December 18, 1927,[5] the son of jurist Tom C. Clark and his wife Mary Jane (née Ramsey). Clark's father served as United States Attorney General from 1945 to 1949 under President Harry S. Truman and then became a Supreme Court Justice in August 1949.[6] His maternal grandfather was William Franklin Ramsey, who served on the Supreme Court of Texas,[7][8] while his paternal grandfather, lawyer William Henry Clark, was president of the Texas Bar Association.[7]
Clark attended Woodrow Wilson High School in Washington, D.C., but dropped out at the age of 17 in order to join the United States Marine Corps, seeing action in Western Europe in the final months of World War II;[7] he served until 1946. Back in the U.S., he earned a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Texas at Austin in 1949, and obtained a Master of Arts in American history from the University of Chicago and a Juris Doctor from the University of Chicago Law School in 1950 and 1951, respectively.[9] While at the University of Texas, he was a member of the Delta Tau Delta fraternity.[10]
He was admitted to the Texas bar in 1950, and was admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1956. From 1951 to 1961, Clark practiced law as an associate and partner at his father's Texas law firm, Clark, Reed and Clark.[11]
Kennedy and Johnson administrations
Attorney General Clark and President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967
In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Clark occupied senior positions in the Justice Department; he was Assistant Attorney General, overseeing the department's Lands Division from 1961 to 1965, and then served as Deputy Attorney General from 1965 to 1967.[12]
In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson nominated him to be Attorney General of the United States. He was confirmed by the Senate and took the oath of office on March 2. Clark was one of Johnson's popular and successful cabinet appointments, being described as "able, independent, liberal and soft-spoken" and a symbol of the New Frontier liberals;[1] he had also built a successful record, especially in his management of the Justice Department's Lands Division; he had increased the efficiency of his division and had saved enough money from his budget so that he had asked Congress to reduce the budget by $200,000 annually.[1]
However, there also was speculation that one of the reasons that contributed to Johnson's making the appointment was the expectation that Clark's father, Associate Justice Tom C. Clark, would resign from the Supreme Court to avoid a conflict of interest.[13] Johnson wanted a vacancy to be created on the Court so he could appoint Thurgood Marshall, the first African American justice. The elder Clark assumed senior status on June 12, 1967, effectively resigning from the Supreme Court and creating the vacancy Johnson apparently desired.[14]
During his years at the Justice Department, Clark played an important role in the history of the civil rights movement. He:
supervised the federal presence at Ole Miss during the week following the admission of James Meredith;
surveyed all school districts in the South desegregating under court order (1963);
supervised federal enforcement of the court order protecting the 1965 Selma to Montgomery marches;
headed the Presidential task force to Watts following the 1965 riots; and
supervised the drafting and executive role in passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Civil Rights Act of 1968.[3]
As attorney general during part of the Vietnam War, Clark oversaw the prosecution of the Boston Five for "conspiracy to aid and abet draft resistance." Four of the five were convicted, including pediatrician Dr. Benjamin Spock and Yale chaplain William Sloane Coffin Jr.,[15] but in later years, Clark expressed his regret at the prosecution's victory: "We won the case, that was the worst part."[16]
Clark served as the attorney general until Johnson's term as president ended on January 20, 1969.[17] Because of Richard Nixon's attacks on Clark's liberal record during the 1968 presidential election campaign and ultimate narrow victory over Hubert H. Humphrey, relations between Johnson and Clark soured and, by inauguration day, they were no longer on speaking terms.[15]
In addition to his government work, during this period Clark was also director of the American Judicature Society (in 1963) and national president of the Federal Bar Association in 1964–65.[17]
Private career
Following his term as attorney general, Clark taught courses at the Howard University School of Law (1969–1972) and Brooklyn Law School (1973–1981).[18] He was active in the anti-Vietnam War movement and visited North Vietnam in 1972 as a protest against the bombing of Hanoi.[15] During this time he was associated with the New York law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, but he resigned in 1973, saying, "I didn't feel like working on things I didn't believe in, I didn't think were important."[19]
On January 28, 1970, Ramsey Clark testified in the Chicago Seven trial. He was barred by Judge Julius Hoffman from testifying before the jury after Clark had testified outside the presence of the jury. Judge Hoffman upheld the prosecution's objections to 14 of Defense Attorney William Kunstler's 38 questions to Clark, but Clark did testify that he had told the prosecutor Tom Foran to investigate the charges against the defendants through Justice Department lawyers "as is generally done in civil rights cases", rather than through a grand jury.[20]
At the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Clark received one delegate vote for the presidential nomination[21] and two delegate votes for the vice-presidential nomination.[22]
In the 1974 New York state election, Clark ran as the Democratic candidate for U.S. Senator; he defeated the party's designee Lee Alexander in the primary, but lost in the general election to the incumbent Jacob Javits. In the 1976 election, Clark again sought the Democratic nomination to represent New York in the Senate, but finished a distant third in the primary behind Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Congresswoman Bella Abzug.[15]
On November 5, 1979, at the start of the Iranian hostage crisis, President Jimmy Carter instructed Clark and Senate staffer William Miller to visit Tehran and seek to open negotiations with Iranian authorities for the hostages' release; while en route, they were refused entry into the country by Ayatollah Khomeini.[23][24] Defying a travel ban, Clark went to Tehran again in June 1980 to attend a conference on alleged U.S. interference in Iranian affairs, on which occasion he was granted admission. While there he both demanded the release of the hostages and criticized past U.S. support for the deposed Shah. This second unauthorized trip reportedly infuriated President Carter.[25][15]
International activism
In September 1998, Clark led a delegation to Sudan to collect evidence in the aftermath of President Bill Clinton's bombing of the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum the previous month as part of Operation Infinite Reach. Upon returning to the U.S., the delegation held a press conference on September 22, 1998, to refute the U.S. State Department's claims that the facility had been producing VX nerve agent.[26] U.S. officials later acknowledged that the evidence cited as the rationale for the Al-Shifa strike was weaker than initially believed.[27]
In 1991, Clark's Coalition to Stop U.S. Intervention in the Middle East opposed the U.S.-led war and sanctions against Iraq.[28] Clark accused the administration of President George H. W. Bush, its officials Dan Quayle, James Baker, Dick Cheney, William Webster, Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, and "others to be named" of "crimes against peace, war crimes", and "crimes against humanity" for its conduct of the Gulf War against Iraq and the ensuing sanctions;[29] in 1996, he added the charges of genocide and the "use of a weapon of mass destruction".[30] Similarly, after the 1999 NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Ramsey charged and "tried" NATO on 19 counts and issued calls for its dissolution.[31]
As a lawyer, Clark was criticized by both opponents and supporters for some of the people he agreed to defend, such as foreign dictators hostile to the United States; Clark stood beside and defended his clients, regardless of their own admitted actions and crimes.[32]
In 2004, Clark joined a panel of about 20 Arab and one other non-Arab lawyers to defend Saddam Hussein in his trial before the Iraqi Special Tribunal.[33] Clark appeared before the Iraqi Special Tribunal in late November 2005 arguing "that it failed to respect basic human rights and was illegal because it was formed as a consequence of the United States' illegal war of aggression against the people of Iraq."[34] Clark said that unless the trial was seen as "absolutely fair", it would "divide rather than reconcile Iraq".[35] Christopher Hitchens said Clark was admitting Hussein's guilt when Clark reportedly stated in a 2005 BBC interview: "He [Saddam] had this huge war going on, and you have to act firmly when you have an assassination attempt".[36]
Hitchens continued to describe Clark in the following terms:
"From bullying prosecutor he mutated into vagrant and floating defense counsel, offering himself to the génocideurs of Rwanda and to Slobodan Milosevic, and using up the spare time in apologetics for North Korea. He acts as front-man for the Workers World Party, which originated in a defense of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956."[36]
Sociologist and anti-communist scholar Paul Hollander wrote of Clark:
"It is likely that well before Clark took his bizarre positions in support of highly repressive, violent, and intolerant political systems and their leaders, he came to the conclusion that the United States was the most dangerous and reprehensible source of evil in the world. This overarching belief led to the reflexive sympathy and support for all the enemies and alleged victims of the United States. They include dictators of different ideological persuasion noted above, whose inhumane qualities and policies Clark was unable to discern or acknowledge, let alone condemn. It was sufficient for Clark's moral accounting that if these dictators were opposed to (and allegedly victimized by) the United States, they deserved and earned his sympathy."[37]
Clark was not alone in criticizing the Iraqi Special Tribunal's trial of Saddam Hussein, which drew intense criticism from international human rights organizations. Human Rights Watch called Saddam's trial a "missed opportunity" and a "deeply flawed trial",[38][39] and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found the trial to be unfair and to violate basic international human rights law.[34] Among the irregularities cited by HRW, were that proceedings were marked by frequent outbursts by both judges and defendants, that three defense lawyers were murdered, that the original chief judge was replaced, that important documents were not given to defense lawyers in advance, that paperwork was lost, and that the judges made asides that pre-judged Saddam Hussein.[40] One of the aforementioned outbursts occurred when Clark was ejected from the trial after passing the judge a memorandum stating that the trial was making "a mockery of justice". The chief judge Raouf Abdul Rahman shouted at Clark, "No, you are the mockery ... get him out. Out!"[41]
On March 18, 2006, Clark attended the funeral of Slobodan Milošević. He commented: "History will prove Milošević was right. Charges are just that: charges. The trial did not have facts." He compared the trial of Milošević with Saddam's, stating "both trials are marred with injustice, both are flawed." He characterized Milošević and Saddam Hussein as "both commanders who were courageous enough to fight more powerful countries."[42]
Ramsey Clark speaks to the anti-war protest in Washington, D.C., on March 20, 2010.
In June 2006, Clark wrote an article criticizing U.S. foreign policy in general, containing a list of 17 U.S. "major aggressions" introduced by "Both branches of our One Party system, Democrat and Republican, favor the use of force to have their way."[a] He followed this by saying, "The United States government may have been able to outspend the Soviet Union into economic collapse in the Cold War arms race, injuring the entire planet in the process. Now Bush has entered a new arms race and is provoking a Second Cold War."[43]
On September 1, 2007, in New York City, Clark called for detained Filipino Jose Maria Sison's release and pledged assistance by joining the latter's legal defense team headed by Jan Fermon. Clark doubted Dutch authorities' "validity and competency", since the murder charges originated in the Philippines and had already been dismissed by the country's Supreme Court.[44]
In November 2007, Clark visited Nandigram in India[45][46] where conflict between state government forces and villagers resulted in the death of at least 14 villagers.[47][48][49] In a December 2007 interview, he described the War on Terrorism as a war against Islam.[50]
Ramsey Clark visiting Nandigram, India, November 2007
In April 2009, Clark spoke at a session of the UN's anti-racism Durban Review Conference at which he accused Israel of genocide.[51]
In September 2010, an essay on torture by Clark was published in a three-part paperback entitled The Torturer in the Mirror (Seven Stories Press).[52][15]
Clark was a recipient of the 1992 Gandhi Peace Award,[53] and also the Peace Abbey Courage of Conscience Award for his commitment to civil rights, his opposition to war and military spending and his dedication to providing legal representation to the peace movement, particularly, his efforts to free Leonard Peltier.[54] In 1999, he traveled to Belgrade to receive an honorary doctorate from Belgrade University.[55][56] In 2008, the United Nations awarded him its Prize in the Field of Human Rights for "his steadfast insistence on respect for human rights and fair judicial process for all".[57]
Advocating the impeachment of George W. Bush
See also: Efforts to impeach George W. Bush
VoteToImpeachFounded 2002
Dissolved January 20, 2009
Type Political advocacy
Focus Impeachment of Bush administration members
Location
Washington, D.C.
Area served
United States
Members
Reported over 1,000,000 signatories
Key people
Ramsey Clark (founder)
In 2002, Clark founded "VoteToImpeach", an organization advocating the impeachment of President George W. Bush and several members of his administration. For the duration of Bush's terms in office, Clark sought, unsuccessfully, for the House of Representatives to bring articles of impeachment against Bush. He was the founder of the International Action Center, which holds significant overlapping membership with the Workers' World Party.[58] Clark and the IAC helped found the protest organization A.N.S.W.E.R. (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism).[59]
On March 19, 2003, the New Jersey newspaper and website The Independent reported Clark's efforts to impeach Bush and others, prior to the start of the Iraq War. The paper commented: "Clark said there is a Web site, www.votetoimpeach.org, dedicated to collecting signatures of U.S. citizens who want President George W. Bush impeached, and that approximately 150,000 have signed to impeach, he said."[60] The Weekly Standard magazine stated in an article dated February 27, 2004, "Ramsey Clark's VoteToImpeach.org is a serious operation", and said the group had run full-sized newspaper advertising on both coasts of the U.S. though the Standard also went on to describe them as also being an "angry petition stage."[61]
Clark's speech to a counter-inauguration protest on January 20, 2005, at John Marshall Park in Washington, D.C., was broadcast by Democracy Now in which Clark stated: "We've had more than 500,000 people sign on 'Vote to Impeach'."[62] The San Francisco Bay Guardian listed the website as one of three "Impeachment links", alongside afterdowningstreet.org and impeachpac.org.[63]
The organization, under Clark's guidance, drafted its own articles of impeachment against President Bush, Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Attorney General John Ashcroft. The document argues that the four committed, "violations and subversions of the Constitution of the United States of America in an attempt to carry out with impunity crimes against peace and humanity and war crimes and deprivations of the civil rights of the people of the United States and other nations, by assuming powers of an imperial executive unaccountable to law and usurping powers of the Congress, the Judiciary and those reserved to the people of the United States."[64] Votetoimpeach.org claimed to have collected over one million signatures in favor of impeachment as of January 2009.[65]
Notable clients
As a lawyer, Clark also provided legal counsel and advice to prominent figures, including many controversial individuals.[66][67]
Regarding his role as a defense lawyer in the trial of Saddam Hussein, Clark said: "A fair trial in this case is absolutely imperative for historical truth."[68] Clark stated that by the time he decided to join Hussein's defense team, it was clear that "proceedings before the Iraqi Special Tribunal would corrupt justice both in fact and in appearance and create more hatred and rage in Iraq against the American occupation...affirmative measures must be taken to prevent prejudice from affecting the conduct of the case and the final judgment of the court...For there to be peace, the days of victor's justice must end."[69]
A partial listing of persons who have reportedly received legal counsel and advice from Ramsey Clark includes:
Lori Berenson, an American convicted of support of MRTA guerrillas in Peru.[70]
Father Philip Berrigan, a Catholic priest and antiwar activist (one of the Harrisburg Seven). Clark served as defense counsel at trial and won an acquittal.[71]
Young church worker Jennifer Casolo, charged by Salvadoran authorities in 1989 with aiding the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. Clark traveled to El Salvador to aid in her defense.[72][73] Casolo was released and deported to the U.S. after 18 days in police detention.[74][75]
Radovan Karadžić, former Bosnian Serb politician. In the 1990s, Clark represented Karadžić in a civil suit brought by Croats and Muslims from the former Yugoslavia who sued Karadžić under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 and Torture Victims Protection Act of 1992 for atrocities and human rights abuses committed during the Bosnian War.[67][76]
About 100 survivors and relatives of the dead members of the Branch Davidian sect, whose Mount Carmel compound besieged by federal agents in a 51-day Waco siege in 1993, resulting in the death of about 80 members. Clark represented the plaintiffs in a suit alleging wrongful death and excessive force, giving an impassioned closing argument in which he called the siege "the greatest domestic law enforcement tragedy in the history of the United States." In a trial in 2000, the jury returned a verdict for the government.[77][78]
"Political-cult guru" Lyndon LaRouche.[79]
Nazi concentration camp commandant Karl Linnas.[80]
Camilo Mejía, a U.S. soldier who deserted his post.[81]
The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws Advisory Board during the 1970s and early 1980s.[82][83]
American Indian Movement prisoner Leonard Peltier.[84]
Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a leader in the Rwandan genocide.[85]
Palestine Liberation Organization leaders in a lawsuit brought by the family of Leon Klinghoffer, who was murdered during hijacking of the Achille Lauro.[16]
Nazi War criminal Jakob "Jack" Reimer, charged for the killings of Jews in Warsaw.[86]
Liberian dictator Charles Taylor[3] during his 1985 fight against extradition from the United States to Liberia, Taylor would later be convicted of crimes against humanity.[87]
Civil rights attorney Stephen Yagman,[88] whose disbarment from U.S. federal court was sought based on his harsh criticism of a federal judge, William Duffy Keller, calling him an anti-Semite and saying he had been drunk on the bench.[89]
In popular culture
In Aaron Sorkin's 2020 film The Trial of the Chicago 7, Clark was portrayed by Michael Keaton.[90]
Personal life
Clark married Georgia Welch, a classmate from the University of Texas, on April 16, 1949. They had two children, Ronda Kathleen Clark and Tom Campbell Clark II. His wife died on July 3, 2010, at the age of 81.[91][92] His son Tom died from cancer on November 23, 2013.[93] Clark lived in Greenwich Village in New York City, where he died on April 9, 2021, at age 93.[15]
Works
Clark, Ramsey (1970). Crime in America: Observations on Its Nature Causes Prevention and Control. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-067120407-5.
— (1974). Crime and Justice. The Great Contemporary Issues. New York: Arno Press. ISBN 978-040504167-9.
— (1992a). The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf. Thunder's Mouth Press. ISBN 978-156025047-0.
— (1992b). War Crimes: A Report on U.S. War Crimes Against Iraq. Maisonneuve Press. ISBN 978-094462415-9.
— (1998). Challenge to Genocide: Let Iraq Live. International Action Center. ISBN 978-096569164-2.
— (2000). NATO in the Balkans: Voices of Opposition. International Action Center. ISBN 978-096569162-8.
— (2002a) [First published 1996]. The Impact of Sanctions on Iraq: The Children Are Dying (2nd ed.). World View Forum. ISBN 978-096569163-5.
— (2002b). "Appendix: On the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". Acts of Aggression: Policing "Rogue" States. By Chomsky, Noam; Zangana, Haifa. Seven Stories Press. ISBN 978-158322546-2.
—; Doebbler, Curtis (2011). The Iraqi Special Tribunal: An Abuse of Justice [Draft Report] (Report). Lulu.com. ASIN B08KWYBVZ5.
—; Douglass, Frederick; Danticat, Edwidge; Dupuy, Ben; Laraque, Paul (2010). Chin, Pat; Dunkel, Greg; Flounders, Sara; Ives, Kim (eds.). Haiti: A Slave Revolution: 200 Years After 1804 (Updated ed.). Youth & The Military Education Project (US). ISBN 978-097475214-3.
— (2010). "Torture, the Cruelest of All Human Acts, Is a Crime in America". The Torturer in the Mirror. By Reifer, Thomas Ehrlich; Zangana, Haifa (First ed.). Seven Stories Press. ISBN 978-158322913-2.
See also
Biography portal
List of peace activists
Progressive Party (South Korea, 2017)
Notes
Clark's list of "major aggressions" by the United States:
Regime change in Iran (1953), the Shah replacing democratically elected Mossadegh; Eisenhower (R).
Regime change in Guatemala (1954), military government for democratically elected Arbenz; Eisenhower (R).
Regime change in Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville) (1961), assassination of Patrice Lumumba; Eisenhower (R).
The Vietnam War (1959–1975); Eisenhower (R), Kennedy (D), Johnson (D), Nixon (R).
Invasion of the Dominican Republic (1965); Johnson (D).
The Contras warfare against Nicaragua (1981–1988), resulting in regime change from the Sandinistas to corrupt capitalists; Reagan (R).
Attack and occupation of Grenada (population 110,000)(1983–1987); Reagan (R)
Aerial attack on the sleeping cities of Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya, (1986); Reagan (R).
Invasion of Panama (1989–1990), regime change; George H. W. Bush (R).
Gulf War (1991); George H. W. Bush (R)
"Humanitarian" occupation of Somalia (1992–1993), leading to 10,000 Somali deaths; George H. W. Bush (R) and Clinton (D).
Aerial attacks on Iraq (1993–2001); Bill Clinton (D)
War against Yugoslavia (1999), 23,000 bombs and missiles dropped on Yugoslavia; Clinton (D).
Missile attack in Khartoum (1998), (21 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles) destroying the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory which provided the majority of all medicines for Sudan; Clinton (D).
Invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (2001–present), regime change; George W. Bush (R).
War of aggression against Iraq and hostile occupation (2003–present); George W. Bush (R).
Regime change in Haiti (2004), deposing the democratically elected Aristide for years of chaos and systematic killings; George W. Bush (R).
References
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Dewhirst, Robert E. (January 1, 2009). "Clark, Ramsey". In Genovese, Michael A. (ed.). Encyclopedia of the American Presidency. Facts on File. pp. 93–94. ISBN 9781438126388. Retrieved April 20, 2022.
McCool, Grant (April 11, 2021). "Ramsey Clark, former U.S. attorney general and human rights activist, dead at 93". Reuters. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Wildstein, David (February 7, 2021). "3 of 12 living ex-U.S. cabinet secretaries over 90 are from New Jersey". New Jersey Globe. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Ramsey Clark (1967–1969)". Miller Center. October 4, 2016. Retrieved January 2, 2019.
"Ancestry of Ramsey Clark". www.wargs.com.
"Ramsey Clark". www.justice.gov. April 13, 2015. Archived from the original on May 2, 2019. Retrieved January 3, 2019.
Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, A Life of Service by Mimi Clark Gronlund, Ramsey Clark, pg. 21
"Diverse Notable Alumni – Diversity & Inclusion". diversity.uchicago.edu.
The Rainbow, vol. 132, no. 2, p. 10.
"USDOJ: Environment and Natural Resources Division 100th Anniversary : Ramsey Clark". September 1, 2009. Archived from the original on September 1, 2009.
"Ramsey Clark". www.justice.gov. April 13, 2015. Archived from the original on May 2, 2019. Retrieved January 3, 2019.
Time Magazine, "The Ramsey Clark Issue", October 18, 1968
"Clark, Tom C." Federal Judicial Center. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Martin, Douglas (April 10, 2021). "Ramsey Clark, Attorney General and Rebel With a Cause, Dies at 93". The New York Times. Retrieved April 10, 2021.
"Ramsey Clark, attorney general who represented Saddam Hussein, dies at 93". The Guardian. Associated Press. April 11, 2021. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Attorney General William Ramsey Clark". United States Department of Justice: Office of the Attorney General. October 23, 2014. Retrieved April 10, 2021.
"Clark, Ramsey, 1927-, Biographical info". LBJ Presidential Library. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Notes on People". The New York Times. May 10, 1973. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Times, J. Anthony Lukas Special to The New York (January 29, 1970). "Chicago 7 Judge Bars Ramsey Clark As Defense Witness". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Our Campaigns - US President - D Convention Race - Jul 10, 1972". www.ourcampaigns.com.
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"The Iran Hostage Crisis: When Compromise Fails". iranhostagecrisis.net. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Cumming-Bruce, Nicholas (November 8, 1979). "Tehran". The Washington Post. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Getlin, Josh (February 18, 1990). "For a Politician, former U.S. Atty. Gen. Ramsey Clark Took a Road Less Traveled--a Hard Left Into the Hotbed of Human Rights Causes : Loner of the Left". The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Brendan (April 28, 2004). "Clinton Bombs Sudanese Pharmaceutical Plant". ThereItIs.org.
Lacey, Marc (October 20, 2005). "Look at the Place! Sudan Says, 'Say Sorry', but U.S. Won't". The New York Times. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
Gelbspan, Ross (January 22, 1991). "Peace activists express concern about anti-semites in movement". The Boston Globe.
War Crimes: A Report on United States War Crimes Against Iraq to the Commission of Inquiry for the International War Crimes Tribunal Archived February 15, 2013, at the Wayback Machine, by Ramsey Clark and others
The Wisdom Fund, "Former US Attorney General Charges US, British and UN Leaders", November 20, 1996
CJPY, "NATO found guilty", June 10, 2000 Archived September 5, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
John Judis, "The Strange Case of Ramsey Clark," The New Republic, April 22, 1991, pp. 23–29.
"US rebel joins Saddam legal team", news.bbc.co.uk, December 29, 2004
"Cases". Archived from the original on September 7, 2008.
"Chaos mars Saddam court hearing", news.bbc.co.uk, December 5, 2005
"Sticking up for Saddam", Slate.com
Hollander, Paul. From Benito Mussolini to Hugo Chavez: Intellectuals and a Century of Political Hero Worship. p. 272.
"Iraq's Shallow Justice" Human Rights Watch, December 29, 2006
"Hanging After Flawed Trial Undermines Rule of Law" Human Rights Watch, December 30, 2006
"Saddam trial 'flawed and unsound'" news.bbc.co.uk, November 20, 2006
"Saddam trial judge ejects Ramsey Clark". Reuters. January 19, 2007. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Balkan scapegoat". Frontline (The Hindu). April 7, 2006. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Ramsey Clark's Indictment of George W. Bush on June 15th, 2006". goodworksonearth.org.
"Ex-US attorney general calls for Joma release". Archived from the original on September 3, 2007.
"Ramsey Clark visits Nandigram". The Hindu. November 30, 2007.
"Nandigram says 'No!' to Dow's chemical hub".
"NHRC sends notice to Chief Secretary, West Bengal, on Nandigram incidents: investigation team of the Commission to visit the area". National Human Rights Commission of India. November 12, 2007. Archived from the original on June 24, 2016.
Hossain, Rakeeb; Chaudhuri, Drimi (November 10, 2007). "CPM cadres kill 3 in Nandigram". Archived from the original on April 17, 2008.
PTI (March 14, 2021). "Chose to fight anti-Bengal forces in Nandigram as mark of respect to martyrs: Mamata Banerjee | India News – Times of India". The Times of India. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Dam, Marcus (December 17, 2007). "Interview: Consumerism and materialism deadlier than armed occupation". The Hindu. Chennai, India. Archived from the original on May 1, 2011.
The U.N.'s Anti-Antiracism Conference, The Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2009.
"The Torturer in the Mirror". Archived from the original on July 12, 2011.
"Horrors in Yemen". Promoting Enduring Peace.
"List of Award Recipients | The Peace Abbey FoundationThe Peace Abbey Foundation".
"Ramsey Clark Adresses Serbian Academic Community". www.oocities.org. Retrieved August 27, 2019.
"Ramsey Clark, the war criminal's best friend". Salon. June 21, 1999. Retrieved August 27, 2019.
"United Nations Human Rights Prize 2008". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Kevin Coogan, "The International Action Center: 'Peace Activists' with a Secret Agenda," Hit List, November/December 2001.
Coogan, "The International Action Center," Hit List, Nov/Dec 2001.
"Ramsey Clark speaks out against war at college". Archived from the original on December 17, 2005.
"Impeach Bush?". February 26, 2004.
"Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark Calls For Bush Impeachment". Democracy Now!.
"San Francisco Bay Guardian". Archived from the original on March 3, 2016. Retrieved September 5, 2009.
"ImpeachBush / VoteToImpeach: Articles of Impeachment". January 13, 2009. Archived from the original on January 13, 2009. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"ImpeachBush / VoteToImpeach". January 5, 2009. Archived from the original on January 5, 2009. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Dennis J. Bernstein, Ramsey Clark's Long Trek for Justice, Consortium News (March 9, 2013).
Josh Saunders, Ramsey Clark's Prosecution Complex: How did Lyndon Johnson's attorney general come to defend dictators, war criminals, and terrorists?, Legal Affairs (November/December 2003).
"Lawyer: Ex-U.S. attorney general to join Saddam defense". CNN. November 27, 2005.
"Why I'm Willing to Defend Hussein". Archived from the original on January 15, 2007.
"Lori Berenson returning to U.S. after 20 years in Peru" CBS News. Associated Press. November 30, 2015.
Christopher Reed, Obituary: Philip Berrigan, Guardian (December 12, 2002).
"American Charged in El Salvador". New York Times. Associated Press. December 6, 1989.
Casolo Retains Ramsey Clark, Los Angeles Times Wire Services (November 28, 1989).
Josh Getlin, Ramsey Clark's Road Less Traveled: the Former Attorney General Took a Hard Left and Hasn't Looked Back, Los Angeles Times (April 15, 1990).
Michael Hirsley, Saint or Sinner? Jennifer Casolo, Freed From El Salvador, Is Now On The Tour Circuit Archived December 22, 2015, at the Wayback Machine, Chicago Tribune (March 17, 1990).
Hope Viner Samborn, Ruling Could Lead to More Human Rights Tort Cases, ABA Journal (December 1995), p. 30.
Sam Howe Verhovek, 5 Years After Waco Standoff, The Spirit of Koresh Lingers, New York Times (April 19, 1998).
Jury clears US over Waco deaths, BBC News (July 15, 2000).
Lizzy Ratner, Ramsey Clark: Why I'm Taking Saddam's Case, Observer (January 10, 2005).
Margolick, David (June 14, 1991). "The Long and Lonely Journey of Ramsey Clark". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Revista Envío - NICARAGUA BRIEFS". www.envio.org.ni. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Public Interest Group Files Civil Suit To Overturn All U.S. Marijuana Laws | News | The Harvard Crimson". www.thecrimson.com. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"NORML 1981 - Drug Legalization". www.nationalfamilies.org. Archived from the original on September 25, 2021. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Chief behind bars". The Guardian. July 10, 1999. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Ramsey Clark, the war criminal's best friend". Salon. June 21, 1999. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Cenziper, Debbie (January 28, 2020). "How a Red Army Officer-Turned-Nazi Recruit Made America His Home". HistoryNet. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Liberia ex-leader Charles Taylor get 50 years in jail". BBC News. May 30, 2012. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Judge Real's Sanctions Against Lawyer Killed but Feud Goes On". Los Angeles Times. November 29, 1991. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
"Attorney Sanctioned for Criticizing Judge : Courts: Panel finds that civil rights lawyer Stephen Yagman tried to force jurist to take himself off cases. He could face reprimand, suspension or other discipline". Los Angeles Times. May 20, 1994. Retrieved April 11, 2021.
Sinha-Roy, Piya (October 25, 2019). "Aaron Sorkin's 'The Trial of the Chicago 7' Adds Michael Keaton, Sets September 2020 Release". The Hollywood Reporter. Archived from the original on November 13, 2020. Retrieved October 25, 2019.
"Deaths Clark, Georgia Welch". The New York Times. July 6, 2010. Retrieved June 6, 2011.
"Death Notices: Georgia Welch Clark". The New York Times. July 6, 2010.
Barnes, Bart (December 23, 2013). "Tom C. Clark II, environmental lawyer, dies at 59". The Washington Post.
Further reading
Citizen Clark: A Life of Principle – documentary film on the life of former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark (2018, 95 minutes)
Victor Navasky, "In memoriam Ramsesy Clark (1927–2021): The former US attorney general was sui generis", The Nation, vol. 312, no. 10 (17/24 May 2021), p. 6.
Wohl, Alexander (2013). Father, Son, and Constitution: How Justice Tom Clark and Attorney General Ramsey Clark Shaped American Democracy. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-070061916-0.
The dark side of history: https://thememoryhole.substack.com/
Counterintelligence (counter-intelligence) or counterespionage (counter-espionage) is any activity aimed at protecting an agency's intelligence program from an opposition's intelligence service.[1] It includes gathering information and conducting activities to prevent espionage, sabotage, assassinations or other intelligence activities conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons.
Many countries will have multiple organizations focusing on a different aspect of counterintelligence, such as domestic, international, and counter-terrorism. Some states will formalize it as part of the police structure, such as the United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Others will establish independent bodies, such as the United Kingdom's MI5, others have both intelligence and counterintelligence grouped under the same agency, like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
History
Political cartoon depicting the Afghan Emir Sher Ali with his "friends" the Russian Bear and British Lion (1878). The Great Game saw the rise of systematic espionage and surveillance throughout the region by both powers
Modern tactics of espionage and dedicated government intelligence agencies developed over the course of the late-19th century. A key background to this development was The Great Game – the strategic rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire throughout Central Asia between 1830 and 1895. To counter Russian ambitions in the region and the potential threat it posed to the British position in India, the Indian Civil Service built up a system of surveillance, intelligence and counterintelligence. The existence of this shadowy conflict was popularized in Rudyard Kipling's famous spy book, Kim (1901), where he portrayed the Great Game (a phrase Kipling popularized) as an espionage and intelligence conflict that "never ceases, day or night".[2]
The establishment of dedicated intelligence and counterintelligence organizations had much to do with the colonial rivalries between the major European powers and to the accelerating development of military technology. As espionage became more widely used, it became imperative to expand the role of existing police and internal security forces into a role of detecting and countering foreign spies. The Evidenzbureau (founded in the Austrian Empire in 1850) had the role from the late-19th century of countering the actions of the Pan-Slavist movement operating out of Serbia.
After the fallout from the Dreyfus affair of 1894–1906 in France, responsibility for French military counter-espionage passed in 1899 to the Sûreté générale—an agency originally responsible for order enforcement and public safety—and overseen by the Ministry of the Interior.[3]
The Okhrana, founded in 1880, had the task of countering enemy espionage against Imperial Russia. St. Petersburg Okhrana group photo, 1905
The Okhrana[4] initially formed in 1880 to combat political terrorism and left-wing revolutionary activity throughout the Russian Empire, was also tasked with countering enemy espionage.[5] Its main concern was the activities of revolutionaries, who often worked and plotted subversive actions from abroad. It set up a branch in Paris, run by Pyotr Rachkovsky, to monitor their activities. The agency used many methods to achieve its goals, including covert operations, undercover agents, and "perlustration"—the interception and reading of private correspondence. The Okhrana became notorious for its use of agents provocateurs, who often succeeded in penetrating the activities of revolutionary groups – including the Bolsheviks.[6]
Integrated counterintelligence agencies run directly by governments were also established. The British government founded the Secret Service Bureau in 1909 as the first independent and interdepartmental agency fully in control over all government counterintelligence activities.
Due to intense lobbying from William Melville and after he obtained German mobilization plans and proof of their financial support to the Boers, the British government authorized the formation of a new intelligence section in the War Office, MO3 (subsequently redesignated MO5) headed by Melville, in 1903. Working under-cover from a flat in London, Melville ran both counterintelligence and foreign intelligence operations, capitalizing on the knowledge and foreign contacts he had accumulated during his years running Special Branch.
Due to its success, the Government Committee on Intelligence, with support from Richard Haldane and Winston Churchill, established the Secret Service Bureau in 1909 as a joint initiative of the Admiralty, the War Office and the Foreign Office to control secret intelligence operations in the UK and overseas, particularly concentrating on the activities of the Imperial German government. Its first director was Captain Sir George Mansfield Smith-Cumming alias "C".[7] The Secret Service Bureau was split into a foreign and counter-intelligence domestic service in 1910. The latter, headed by Sir Vernon Kell, originally aimed at calming public fears of large-scale German espionage.[8] As the Service was not authorized with police powers, Kell liaised extensively with the Special Branch of Scotland Yard (headed by Basil Thomson), and succeeded in disrupting the work of Indian revolutionaries collaborating with the Germans during the war. Instead of a system whereby rival departments and military services would work on their own priorities with little to no consultation or cooperation with each other, the newly established Secret Intelligence Service was interdepartmental, and submitted its intelligence reports to all relevant government departments.[9]
For the first time, governments had access to peacetime, centralized independent intelligence and counterintelligence bureaucracy with indexed registries and defined procedures, as opposed to the more ad hoc methods used previously.
Categories
Collective counterintelligence is gaining information about an opponent's intelligence collection capabilities whose aim is at an entity.
Defensive counterintelligence is thwarting efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate the service.
Offensive counterintelligence is having identified an opponent's efforts against the system, trying to manipulate these attacks by either "turning" the opponent's agents into double agents or feeding them false information to report.[10]
Counterintelligence, counterterror, and government
Many governments organize counterintelligence agencies separately and distinct from their intelligence collection services. In most countries the counterintelligence mission is spread over multiple organizations, though one usually predominates. There is usually a domestic counterintelligence service, usually part of a larger law enforcement organization such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States.[11]
The United Kingdom has the separate Security Service, also known as MI5, which does not have direct police powers but works closely with law enforcement especially Special Branch that can carry out arrests, do searches with a warrant, etc.[12]
The Russian Federation's major domestic security organization is the FSB, which principally came from the Second Chief Directorate and Third Chief Directorate of the USSR's KGB.
Canada separates the functions of general defensive counterintelligence (contre-ingérence), security intelligence (the intelligence preparation necessary to conduct offensive counterintelligence), law enforcement intelligence, and offensive counterintelligence.
Military organizations have their own counterintelligence forces, capable of conducting protective operations both at home and when deployed abroad.[13] Depending on the country, there can be various mixtures of civilian and military in foreign operations. For example, while offensive counterintelligence is a mission of the US CIA's National Clandestine Service, defensive counterintelligence is a mission of the U.S. Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), Department of State, who work on protective security for personnel and information processed abroad at US Embassies and Consulates.[14]
The term counter-espionage is really specific to countering HUMINT, but, since virtually all offensive counterintelligence involves exploiting human sources, the term "offensive counterintelligence" is used here to avoid some ambiguous phrasing.
Other countries also deal with the proper organization of defenses against Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS), often with separate services with no common authority below the head of government.
France, for example, builds its domestic counterterror in a law enforcement framework. In France, a senior anti-terror magistrate is in charge of defense against terrorism. French magistrates have multiple functions that overlap US and UK functions of investigators, prosecutors, and judges. An anti-terror magistrate may call upon France's domestic intelligence service Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (DGSI), which may work with the Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE), foreign intelligence service.
Spain gives its Interior Ministry, with military support, the leadership in domestic counterterrorism. For international threats, the National Intelligence Center (CNI) has responsibility. CNI, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, is staffed principally by which is subordinated directly to the Prime Minister's office. After the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings, the national investigation found problems between the Interior Ministry and CNI, and, as a result, the National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Center was created. Spain's 3/11 Commission called for this center to do operational coordination as well as information collection and dissemination.[15] The military has organic counterintelligence to meet specific military needs.
Counterintelligence missions
Frank Wisner, a well-known CIA operations executive said of the autobiography of Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles,[16] that Dulles "disposes of the popular misconception that counterintelligence is essentially a negative and responsive activity, that it moves only or chiefly in reaction to situations thrust upon it and in counter to initiatives mounted by the opposition." Rather, he sees that can be most effective, both in information gathering and protecting friendly intelligence services, when it creatively but vigorously attacks the "structure and personnel of hostile intelligence services."[17] Today's counterintelligence missions have broadened from the time when the threat was restricted to the foreign intelligence services (FIS) under the control of nation-states. Threats have broadened to include threats from non-national or trans-national groups, including internal insurgents, organized crime, and transnational based groups (often called "terrorists", but that is limiting). Still, the FIS term remains the usual way of referring to the threat against which counterintelligence protects.
In modern practice, several missions are associated with counterintelligence from the national to the field level.
Defensive analysis is the practice of looking for vulnerabilities in one's own organization, and, with due regard for risk versus benefit, closing the discovered holes.
Offensive counterespionage is the set of techniques that at least neutralizes discovered FIS personnel and arrests them or, in the case of diplomats, expels them by declaring them persona non grata. Beyond that minimum, it exploits FIS personnel to gain intelligence for one's own side, or actively manipulates the FIS personnel to damage the hostile FIS organization.
Counterintelligence force protection source operations (CFSO) are human source operations, conducted abroad that are intended to fill the existing gap in national-level coverage in protecting a field station or force from terrorism and espionage.
Counterintelligence is part of intelligence cycle security, which, in turn, is part of intelligence cycle management. A variety of security disciplines also fall under intelligence security management and complement counterintelligence, including:
Physical security
Personnel security
Communications security (COMSEC)
Informations system security (INFOSEC)
security classification
Operations security (OPSEC)
The disciplines involved in "positive security," measures by which one's own society collects information on its actual or potential security, complement security. For example, when communications intelligence identifies a particular radio transmitter as one used only by a particular country, detecting that transmitter inside one's own country suggests the presence of a spy that counterintelligence should target. In particular, counterintelligence has a significant relationship with the collection discipline of HUMINT and at least some relationship with the others. Counterintelligence can both produce information and protect it.
All US departments and agencies with intelligence functions are responsible for their own security abroad, except those that fall under Chief of Mission authority.[18]
Governments try to protect three things:
Their personnel
Their installations
Their operations
In many governments, the responsibility for protecting these things is split. Historically, CIA assigned responsibility for protecting its personnel and operations to its Office of Security, while it assigned the security of operations to multiple groups within the Directorate of Operations: the counterintelligence staff and the area (or functional) unit, such as Soviet Russia Division. At one point, the counterintelligence unit operated quite autonomously, under the direction of James Jesus Angleton. Later, operational divisions had subordinate counterintelligence branches, as well as a smaller central counterintelligence staff. Aldrich Ames was in the Counterintelligence Branch of Europe Division, where he was responsible for directing the analysis of Soviet intelligence operations. US military services have had a similar and even more complex split.
This kind of division clearly requires close coordination, and this in fact occurs on a daily basis. The interdependence of the US counterintelligence community is also manifest in its relationships with liaison services. The counterintelligence community cannot cut off these relationships because of concern about security, but experience has shown that it must calculate the risks involved.[18]
On the other side of the CI coin, counterespionage has one purpose that transcends all others in importance: penetration. The emphasis which the KGB places on penetration is evident in the cases already discussed from the defensive or security viewpoint. The best security system in the world cannot provide an adequate defense against it because the technique involves people. The only way to be sure that an enemy has been contained is to know his plans in advance and in detail.
Moreover, only a high-level penetration of the opposition can tell you whether your own service is penetrated. A high-level defector can also do this, but the adversary knows that he defected and within limits can take remedial action. Conducting CE without the aid of penetrations is like fighting in the dark. Conducting CE with penetrations can be like shooting fish in a barrel.[18]
In the British service, the cases of the Cambridge Five, and the later suspicions about MI5 chief Sir Roger Hollis caused great internal dissension. Clearly, the British were penetrated by Philby, but it has never been determined, in any public forum, if there were other serious penetrations. In the US service, there was also significant disruption over the contradictory accusations about moles from defectors Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuri Nosenko, and their respective supporters in CIA and the British Security Service (MI5). Golitsyn was generally believed by Angleton. George Kisevalter, the CIA operations officer that was the CIA side of the joint US-UK handling of Oleg Penkovsky, did not believe Angleton's theory that Nosenko was a KGB plant. Nosenko had exposed John Vassall, a KGB asset principally in the British Admiralty, but there were arguments Vassall was a KGB sacrifice to protect other operations, including Nosenko and a possibly more valuable source on the Royal Navy.
Defensive counterintelligence
Defensive counterintelligence starts by looking for places in one's own organization that could easily be exploited by foreign intelligence services (FIS). FIS is an established term of art in the counterintelligence community, and, in today's world, "foreign" is shorthand for "opposing." Opposition might indeed be a country, but it could be a transnational group or an internal insurgent group. Operations against a FIS might be against one's own nation, or another friendly nation. The range of actions that might be done to support a friendly government can include a wide range of functions, certainly including military or counterintelligence activities, but also humanitarian aid and aid to development ("nation building").[19]
Terminology here is still emerging, and "transnational group" could include not only terrorist groups but also transnational criminal organization. Transnational criminal organizations include the drug trade, money laundering, extortion targeted against computer or communications systems, smuggling, etc.
"Insurgent" could be a group opposing a recognized government by criminal or military means, as well as conducting clandestine intelligence and covert operations against the government in question, which could be one's own or a friendly one.
Counterintelligence and counterterrorism analyses provide strategic assessments of foreign intelligence and terrorist groups and prepare tactical options for ongoing operations and investigations. Counterespionage may involve proactive acts against foreign intelligence services, such as double agents, deception, or recruiting foreign intelligence officers. While clandestine HUMINT sources can give the greatest insight into the adversary's thinking, they may also be most vulnerable to the adversary's attacks on one's own organization. Before trusting an enemy agent, remember that such people started out as being trusted by their own countries and may still be loyal to that country.
Offensive counterintelligence operations
Wisner emphasized his own, and Dulles', views that the best defense against foreign attacks on, or infiltration of, intelligence services is active measures against those hostile services.[17] This is often called counterespionage: measures taken to detect enemy espionage or physical attacks against friendly intelligence services, prevent damage and information loss, and, where possible, to turn the attempt back against its originator. Counterespionage goes beyond being reactive and actively tries to subvert hostile intelligence service, by recruiting agents in the foreign service, by discrediting personnel actually loyal to their own service, and taking away resources that would be useful to the hostile service. All of these actions apply to non-national threats as well as to national organizations.
If the hostile action is in one's own country or in a friendly one with co-operating police, the hostile agents may be arrested, or, if diplomats, declared persona non grata. From the perspective of one's own intelligence service, exploiting the situation to the advantage of one's side is usually preferable to arrest or actions that might result in the death of the threat. The intelligence priority sometimes comes into conflict with the instincts of one's own law enforcement organizations, especially when the foreign threat combines foreign personnel with citizens of one's country.
In some circumstances, arrest may be a first step in which the prisoner is given the choice of co-operating or facing severe consequence up to and including a death sentence for espionage. Co-operation may consist of telling all one knows about the other service but preferably actively assisting in deceptive actions against the hostile service.
Counterintelligence protection of intelligence services
Defensive counterintelligence specifically for intelligence services involves risk assessment of their culture, sources, methods and resources. Risk management must constantly reflect those assessments, since effective intelligence operations are often risk-taking. Even while taking calculated risks, the services need to mitigate risk with appropriate countermeasures.
FIS are especially able to explore open societies and, in that environment, have been able to subvert insiders in the intelligence community. Offensive counterespionage is the most powerful tool for finding penetrators and neutralizing them, but it is not the only tool. Understanding what leads individuals to turn on their own side is the focus of Project Slammer. Without undue violations of personal privacy, systems can be developed to spot anomalous behavior, especially in the use of information systems.
Decision makers require intelligence free from hostile control or manipulation. Since every intelligence discipline is subject to manipulation by our adversaries, validating the reliability of intelligence from all collection platforms is essential. Accordingly, each counterintelligence organization will validate the reliability of sources and methods that relate to the counterintelligence mission in accordance with common standards. For other mission areas, the USIC will examine collection, analysis, dissemination practices, and other intelligence activities and will recommend improvements, best practices, and common standards.[20]
Intelligence is vulnerable not only to external but also to internal threats. Subversion, treason, and leaks expose vulnerabilities, governmental and commercial secrets, and intelligence sources and methods. The insider threat has been a source of extraordinary damage to US national security, as with Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and Edward Lee Howard, all of whom had access to major clandestine activities. Had an electronic system to detect anomalies in browsing through counterintelligence files been in place, Robert Hanssen's searches for suspicion of activities of his Soviet (and later Russian) paymasters might have surfaced early. Anomalies might simply show that an especially-creative analyst has a trained intuition possible connections and is trying to research them.
Adding the new tools and techniques to [national arsenals], the counterintelligence community will seek to manipulate foreign spies, conduct aggressive investigations, make arrests and, where foreign officials are involved, expel them for engaging in practices inconsistent with their diplomatic status or exploit them as an unwitting channel for deception, or turn them into witting double agents.[20] "Witting" is a term of intelligence art that indicates that one is not only aware of a fact or piece of information but also aware of its connection to intelligence activities.
Victor Suvorov, the pseudonym of a former Soviet military intelligence (GRU) officer, makes the point that a defecting HUMINT officer is a special threat to walk-in or other volunteer assets of the country that he is leaving. Volunteers who are "warmly welcomed" do not take into consideration the fact that they are despised by hostile intelligence agents.
The Soviet operational officer, having seen a great deal of the ugly face of communism, very frequently feels the utmost repulsion to those who sell themselves to it willingly. And when a GRU or KGB officer decides to break with his criminal organization, something which fortunately happens quite often, the first thing he will do is try to expose the hated volunteer.[21]
Counterintelligence force protection source operations
Attacks against military, diplomatic, and related facilities are a very real threat, as demonstrated by the 1983 attacks against French and US peacekeepers in Beirut, the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, 1998 attacks on Colombian bases and on U.S. embassies (and local buildings) in Kenya and Tanzania the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, and many others. The U.S. military force protection measures are the set of actions taken against military personnel and family members, resources, facilities and critical information, and most countries have a similar doctrine for protecting those facilities and conserving the potential of the forces. Force protection is defined to be a defense against deliberate attack, not accidents or natural disasters.
Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) are human source operations, normally clandestine in nature, conducted abroad that are intended to fill the existing gap in national level coverage, as well as satisfying the combatant commander's intelligence requirements.[22] Military police and other patrols that mingle with local people may indeed be valuable HUMINT sources for counterintelligence awareness, but are not themselves likely to be CFSOs. Gleghorn distinguishes between the protection of national intelligence services, and the intelligence needed to provide combatant commands with the information they need for force protection. There are other HUMINT sources, such as military reconnaissance patrols that avoid mixing with foreign personnel, that indeed may provide HUMINT, but not HUMINT especially relevant to counterintelligence.[23] Active countermeasures, whether for force protection, protection of intelligence services, or protection of national security interests, are apt to involve HUMINT disciplines, for the purpose of detecting FIS agents, involving screening and debriefing of non-tasked human sources, also called casual or incidental sources. such as:
walk-ins and write-ins (individuals who volunteer information)
unwitting sources (any individual providing useful information to counterintelligence, who in the process of divulging such information may not know they are aiding an investigation)
defectors and enemy prisoners of war (EPW)
refugee populations and expatriates
interviewees (individuals contacted in the course of an investigation)
official liaison sources.
Physical security is important, but it does not override the role of force protection intelligence... Although all intelligence disciplines can be used to gather force protection intelligence, HUMINT collected by intelligence and CI agencies plays a key role in providing indications and warning of terrorist and other force protection threats.[24]
Force protection, for forces deployed in host countries, occupation duty, and even at home, may not be supported sufficiently by a national-level counterterrorism organization alone. In a country, colocating FPCI personnel, of all services, with military assistance and advisory units, allows agents to build relationships with host nation law enforcement and intelligence agencies, get to know the local environments, and improve their language skills. FPCI needs a legal domestic capability to deal with domestic terrorism threats.
As an example of terrorist planning cycles, the Khobar Towers attack shows the need for long-term FPCI. "The Hizballah operatives believed to have conducted this attack began intelligence collection and planning activities in 1993. They recognized American military personnel were billeted at Khobar Towers in the fall of 1994 and began surveillance of the facility, and continued to plan, in June 1995. In March 1996, Saudi Arabian border guards arrested a Hizballah member attempting plastic explosive into the country, leading to the arrest of two more Hizballah members. Hizballah leaders recruited replacements for those arrested, and continued planning for the attack."[25]
Defensive counterintelligence operations
In U.S. doctrine, although not necessarily that of other countries, CI is now seen as primarily a counter to FIS HUMINT. In the 1995 US Army counterintelligence manual, CI had a broader scope against the various intelligence collection disciplines. Some of the overarching CI tasks are described as
Developing, maintaining, and disseminating multidiscipline threat data and intelligence files on organizations, locations, and individuals of CI interest. This includes insurgent and terrorist infrastructure and individuals who can assist in the CI mission.
Educating personnel in all fields of security. A component of this is the multidiscipline threat briefing. Briefings can and should be tailored, both in scope and classification level. Briefings could then be used to familiarize supported commands with the nature of the multidiscipline threat posed against the command or activity.
More recent US joint intelligence doctrine[26] restricts its primary scope to counter-HUMINT, which usually includes counter-terror. It is not always clear, under this doctrine, who is responsible for all intelligence collection threats against a military or other resource. The full scope of US military counterintelligence doctrine has been moved to a classified publication, Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.
More specific countermeasures against intelligence collection disciplines are listed below
CI roles against Intelligence Collection Disciplines, 1995 doctrine[22] Discipline Offensive CI Defensive CI
HUMINT Counterreconnaissance, offensive counterespionage Deception in operations security
SIGINT Recommendations for kinetic and electronic attack Radio OPSEC, use of secure telephones, SIGSEC, deception
IMINT Recommendations for kinetic and electronic attack Deception, OPSEC countermeasures, deception (decoys, camouflage)
If accessible, use SATRAN reports of satellites overhead to hide or stop activities while being viewed
Counter-HUMINT
Counter-HUMINT deals with both the detection of hostile HUMINT sources within an organization, or the detection of individuals likely to become hostile HUMINT sources, as a mole or double agent. There is an additional category relevant to the broad spectrum of counterintelligence: why one becomes a terrorist.[citation needed]
The acronym MICE:
Money
Ideology
Compromise (or coercion)
Ego
describes the most common reasons people break trust and disclose classified materials, reveal operations to hostile services, or join terrorist groups. It makes sense, therefore, to monitor trusted personnel for risks in these areas, such as financial stress, extreme political views, potential vulnerabilities for blackmail, and excessive need for approval or intolerance of criticism. With luck, problems in an employee can be caught early, assistance can be provided to correct them, and not only is espionage avoided, but a useful employee retained.
Sometimes, the preventive and neutralization tasks overlap, as in the case of Earl Edwin Pitts. Pitts had been an FBI agent who had sold secret information to the Soviets, and, after the fall of the USSR, to the Russians. He was caught by an FBI false flag sting, in which FBI agents, posing as Russian FSB agents, came to Pitts with an offer to "reactivate" him. His activities seemed motivated by both money and ego over perceived bad treatment when he was an FBI agent. His sentence required him to tell the FBI all he knew of foreign agents. Ironically, he told them of suspicious actions by Robert Hanssen, which were not taken seriously at the time.
Motivations for information and operations disclosure
To go beyond slogans, Project Slammer was an effort of the Intelligence Community Staff, under the Director of Central Intelligence, to come up with characteristics of an individual likely to commit espionage against the United States. It "examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionage subjects. Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better understand the subjects' private lives and how they are perceived by others while conducting espionage."[27]
How an espionage subject sees himself (at the time of espionage) Attitude Manifestations
Basic belief structure – Special, even unique.
– Deserving.
– The individual's situation is not satisfactory.
– No other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage).
– Doing only what others frequently do.
– Not a bad person.
– Performance in a government job (if presently employed) is separate from espionage; espionage does not (really) discount contribution in the workplace.
– Security procedures do not (really) apply to the individual.
– Security programs (e.g., briefings) have no meaning for the individual unless they connect with something with which they can personally identify.
Feels isolated from the consequences of his actions: – The individual sees their situation in a context in which they face continually narrowing options until espionage seems reasonable. The process that evolves into espionage reduces barriers, making it essentially "Okay" to initiate the crime.
– They see espionage as a "Victimless" crime.
– Once they consider espionage, they figure out how it might be done. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous events.
– Subject finds that it is easy to go around security safeguards (or is able to solve that problem). They belittle the security system, feeling that if the information was really important espionage would be hard to do (the information would really be better protected). This "Ease of accomplishment" further reinforces resolve.
Attempts to cope with espionage activity – Anxious on initial hostile intelligence service contact (some also feel thrill and excitement).
– After a relationship with espionage activity and HOIS develops, the process becomes much more bearable, espionage continues (even flourishes).
– In the course of long-term activity, subjects may reconsider their involvement.
– Some consider breaking their role to become an operative for the government. This occurs when access to classified information is lost or there is a perceived need to prove themselves or both.
– Others find that espionage activity becomes stressful, they no longer want it. Glamour (if present earlier) subsides. They are reluctant to continue. They may even break contact.
– Sometimes they consider telling authorities what they have done. Those wanting to reverse their role aren't confessing, they're negotiating. Those who are "Stressed out" want to confess. Neither wants punishment. Both attempt to minimize or avoid punishment.
According to a press report about Project Slammer and Congressional oversight of counterespionage, one fairly basic function is observing one's own personnel for behavior that either suggests that they could be targets for foreign HUMINT, or may already have been subverted. News reports indicate that in hindsight, red flags were flying but not noticed.[28] In several major penetrations of US services, such as Aldrich Ames, the Walker ring or Robert Hanssen, the individual showed patterns of spending inconsistent with their salary. Some people with changed spending may have a perfectly good reason, such as an inheritance or even winning the lottery, but such patterns should not be ignored.
Personnel in sensitive positions, who have difficulty getting along with peers, may become risks for being compromised with an approach based on ego. William Kampiles, a low-level worker in the CIA Watch Center, sold, for a small sum, the critical operations manual on the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite. To an interviewer, Kampiles suggested that if someone had noted his "problem"—constant conflicts with supervisors and co-workers—and brought in outside counseling, he might not have stolen the KH-11 manual.[28]
By 1997, the Project Slammer work was being presented at public meetings of the Security Policy Advisory Board.[29] While a funding cut caused the loss of impetus in the mid-nineties, there are research data used throughout the security community. They emphasize the
essential and multi-faceted motivational patterns underlying espionage. Future Slammer analyses will focus on newly developing issues in espionage such as the role of money, the new dimensions of loyalty and what seems to be a developing trend toward economic espionage.
Counter-SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)
Military and security organizations will provide secure communications, and may monitor less secure systems, such as commercial telephones or general Internet connections, to detect inappropriate information being passed through them. Education on the need to use secure communications, and instruction on using them properly so that they do not become vulnerable to specialized technical interception.
Counter-IMINT (Imagery Intelligence)
The basic methods of countering IMINT are to know when the opponent will use imaging against one's own side, and interfering with the taking of images. In some situations, especially in free societies, it must be accepted that public buildings may always be subject to photography or other techniques.
Countermeasures include putting visual shielding over sensitive targets or camouflaging them. When countering such threats as imaging satellites, awareness of the orbits can guide security personnel to stop an activity, or perhaps cover the sensitive parts, when the satellite is overhead. This also applies to imaging on aircraft and UAVs, although the more direct expedient of shooting them down, or attacking their launch and support area, is an option in wartime.
Counter-OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence)
While the concept well precedes the recognition of a discipline of OSINT, the idea of censorship of material directly relevant to national security is a basic OSINT defense. In democratic societies, even in wartime, censorship must be watched carefully lest it violate reasonable freedom of the press, but the balance is set differently in different countries and at different times.
The United Kingdom is generally considered to have a very free press, but there is the DA-Notice, formerly D-notice system. Many British journalists find that the system is used fairly, but there will always be arguments. In the specific context of counterintelligence, note that Peter Wright, a former senior member of the Security Service who left their service without his pension, moved to Australia before publishing his book Spycatcher. While much of the book was reasonable commentary, it revealed some specific and sensitive techniques, such as Operation RAFTER, a means of detecting the existence and setting of radio receivers.
Counter-MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence)
MASINT is mentioned here for completeness, but the discipline contains so varied a range of technologies that a type-by-type strategy is beyond the current scope. One example, however, can draw on the Operation RAFTER technique revealed in Wright's book. With the knowledge that Radiofrequency MASINT was being used to pick up an internal frequency in radio receivers, it would be possible to design a shielded receiver that would not radiate the signal that RAFTER monitored.
Theory of offensive counterintelligence
Offensive techniques in current counterintelligence doctrine are principally directed against human sources, so counterespionage can be considered a synonym for offensive counterintelligence. At the heart of exploitation operations is the objective to degrade the effectiveness of an adversary's intelligence service or a terrorist organization. Offensive counterespionage (and counterterrorism) is done one of two ways, either by manipulating the adversary (FIS or terrorist) in some manner or by disrupting the adversary's normal operations.
Defensive counterintelligence operations that succeed in breaking up a clandestine network by arresting the persons involved or by exposing their actions demonstrate that disruption is quite measurable and effective against FIS if the right actions are taken. If defensive counterintelligence stops terrorist attacks, it has succeeded.
Offensive counterintelligence seeks to damage the long-term capability of the adversary. If it can lead a national adversary into putting large resources into protecting from a nonexistent threat, or if it can lead terrorists to assume that all of their "sleeper" agents in a country have become unreliable and must be replaced (and possibly killed as security risks), there is a greater level of success than can be seen from defensive operations alone, To carry out offensive counterintelligence, however, the service must do more than detect; it must manipulate persons associated with the adversary.
The Canadian Department of National Defence makes some useful logical distinctions in its Directive on its[30] National Counter-Intelligence Unit. The terminology is not the same as used by other services, but the distinctions are useful:
"Counter-intelligence (contre-ingérence) means activities concerned with identifying and counteracting threats to the security of DND employees, CF members, and DND and CF property and information, that are posed by hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities." This corresponds to defensive counterintelligence in other services.
"Security intelligence (renseignement de sécurité) means intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities." This does not (emphasis added) correspond directly to offensive counterintelligence, but is the intelligence preparation necessary to conduct offensive counterintelligence.
The duties of the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit include "identifying, investigating and countering threats to the security of the DND and the CF from espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, and other criminal activity; identifying, investigating and countering the actual or possible compromise of highly classified or special DND or CF material; conducting CI security investigations, operations and security briefings and debriefings to counter threats to, or to preserve, the security of DND and CF interests." This mandate is a good statement of a mandate to conduct offensive counterintelligence.
DND further makes the useful clarification,[31] "The security intelligence process should not be confused with the liaison conducted by members of the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) for the purpose of obtaining criminal intelligence, as the collection of this type of information is within their mandate."
Manipulating an intelligence professional, himself trained in counterintelligence, is no easy task, unless he is already predisposed toward the opposing side. Any effort that does not start with a sympathetic person will take a long-term commitment, and creative thinking to overcome the defenses of someone who knows he is a counterintelligence target and also knows counterintelligence techniques.
Terrorists on the other hand, although they engage in deception as a function of security appear to be more prone to manipulation or deception by a well-placed adversary than are foreign intelligence services. This is in part due to the fact that many terrorist groups, whose members "often mistrust and fight among each other, disagree, and vary in conviction.", are not as internally cohesive as foreign intelligence services, potentially leaving them more vulnerable to both deception and manipulation.
Further reading
Johnson, William R. Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to Be a Counterintelligence Officer (2009)
Ginkel, B. van (2012). "Towards the intelligent use of intelligence: Quis Custodiet ipsos Custodes?". 3 (10). The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
Lee, Newton (2015). Counterterrorism and Cybersecurity: Total Information Awareness (Second ed.). Springer International Publishing Switzerland. ISBN 978-3319172439.
Selby, Scott Andrew. The Axmann Conspiracy: The Nazi Plan for a Fourth Reich and How the U.S. Army Defeated It. Berkley (Penguin), Sept. 2012. ISBN 0425252701
Toward a Theory of CI
See also
Irregular warfare
List of counterintelligence organizations
FBI Counterintelligence Division
SAEDA
The Institute of World Politics
X-2 Counter Espionage Branch
References
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